Chat with us, powered by LiveChat Critical Thinking Essay: Wal-Mart’s Global Strategies | Abc Paper

I need your help for writing essay (5 pages not including the cover page and references page)  
The topic as below:
Wal-Mart’s Global Strategies
In Chapters 8 and 9, we reviewed several types of global expansion  strategies a company can undertake when entering new markets. For this  assignment, you will read Walmart’s Global Strategies case study (p. 279) and then respond to the following questions and make decisions based on those questions.

What was Walmart’s early global expansion strategy? Was this a good strategy for Walmart? Why or why not?
What cultural problems did Walmart face in some of the international markets it entered?

Now, assume the role as the Director of Walmart’s global strategic  planning team. You have been tasked to explore the benefits and  challenges of expansion into one of the following regions. Choose one of  the following regions and describe the opportunities and challenges in  that region. Summarize the cultural environment, choose an entry  strategy from the text, and describe how you would implement this entry  strategy. Make sure you are very detailed in your explanation.

Latin America
European Union
Southeast Asia
Middle East

– Write an essay that includes an introduction paragraph, the essay’s   body, and a conclusion paragraph to address the assignment’s   guide questions. – Do not address the questions using a  question-and-answer format.  
 –  Charts/diagrams should be labeled and can be added within the body of your paper.  
– APA style should be used  
– Font will be: Times roman 12, and double space should be between  lines   
-At least 3-4 scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles will be  used as references (including the below two).     

Recommended Reference:   
“In-Depth Integrative Case Study 2.2: Walmart’s Global  Strategies” (p. 279) in International  Management: Culture, Strategy, and Behavior 
Ahsan, M., & van Wyk, J.  (2018). Going past entry mode: Examining foreign operation mode  changes at the strategic business unit level. Journal of Managerial Issues, 30(1), 28.
Jiang, F., Ananthram, S., &  Li, J. (2018). Global mindset and entry mode decisions: Moderating roles of  managers’ decision-making style and managerial experience. Management  International Review, 58(3),  413-447.


operations, with 6,300 stores and more than 900,000 asso-
ciates in 27 countries outside the continental U.S.5 (See
Exhibit 1.) According to international chief C. Douglas
McMillon, Walmart is “progressing from being a domes-
tic company with an international division to being a
global company.” In two decades Walmart International
has become a $100 billion business. If it were a stand-
alone company, it would rank among the top five global
retailers.6 (See Exhibit 2.) Walmart International’s

In 1991, Walmart became an international company when
it opened a Sam’s Club near Mexico City. Just two years
later, Walmart International was created. Since venturing
into Mexico in 1991, Walmart International has grown
somewhat erratically. During the 1990s, the retailer
exported its big-box, low-price model, an approach the
company expected to be as successful in foreign markets
as it was in the United States. Although Walmart has had
success in several overseas markets, this success has been
far from universal. For example, in Mexico, China, and the
U.K., the company’s efforts to offer the lowest price to
customers backfired because of resistance from established
retailers. And in Germany, Walmart could not seem to fit
its model to local tastes and preferences. In Japan, its joint
venture had a series of setbacks, many related to buying
habits for which the Walmart model did not respond well.
In Mexico, three of the largest domestic retailers con-
structed a joint buying and operational alliance solely to
compete with Walmart.1 Its presence in Hong Kong ended
after only two years during the 1990s, and it shuttered
operations in Indonesia in the mid-1990s after rioting inci-
dents in Jakarta. Walmart also owned approximately 16
stores in South Korea and 85 in Germany; however, it sold
off these operations in 2006 after merchandise failed to
match consumer tastes, distribution and re-bagging prob-
lems arose, and strong loyalties to other brands made
attracting customers difficult and expensive.2

In addition, labor advocates and environmentalists have
created headaches for the U.S. behemoth, making contin-
ued expansion both cumbersome and expensive. For
instance, in 2006, Walmart faced a strong public relations
campaign from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) over Walmart’s refusal to let its workers in
China unionize. Walmart was eventually forced to con-
cede, perhaps because the Chinese government also lent
its weight to the ACFTU’s campaign in its effort to estab-
lish unions in all foreign-funded enterprises throughout
the country.3 Despite its public battle with the ACFTU,
Walmart China received the Howard Award for “Most
Respectable Foreign Enterprise in China” in 2014.4 As
Walmart continues to expand its global operations, ana-
lysts are curious to see how the company is received and
whether consumers’ opinions in fragmented market set-
tings are a match with Walmart’s low-price model.

Notwithstanding these challenges, today Walmart
International is a fast-growing part of Walmart’s overall

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.2

Walmart’s Global Strategies

Exhibit 1 Walmart International Operations, June 2015
Retail Units
Market (June 2015) Date of Entry

Mexico 2,360 November 1991
Canada     400 November 1994
Brazil 499 May 1995
Argentina 108 August 1995
China 433 August 1996
United Kingdom 621 July 1999
Japan 346 March 2002
Costa Rica 225 September 2005
El Salvador 91 September 2005
Guatemala 223 September 2005
Honduras 82 September 2005
Nicaragua 88 September 2005
Chile 399 January 2009
India 21 May 2009

Source: “Where in the World Is Walmart?”  Walmart,
story/our-locations  (last visited March 3, 2016).

Exhibit 2 The Largest Global Retailers, 2014
Walmart $476bn

$105bn Costco

$99bn Carrefour





$98bn Kroger

$86bn Metro Ag

$81bn Aldi

$79bn Home Depot

$73bn Target

Source: Original graphic created based on information from Deloitte (

280 Part 2 The Role of Culture

Walmart Early Internationalization
In venturing beyond its large domestic market, Walmart
had a number of regional options, including entering
Europe, Asia, or other countries in the Western hemi-
sphere. (See Exhibits 3 and 4.) At the time, however,
Walmart lacked the requisite financial, organizational, and
managerial resources to pursue multiple countries simul-
taneously. Instead, it opted for a logically sequenced
approach to market entry that would allow it to apply the
learning gained from its initial entries to subsequent ones.
In the end, during the first five years of its globalization
(1991 to 1995), Walmart decided to concentrate heavily
on establishing a presence in the Americas: Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, and Canada. Obviously, Canada had the
business environment closest to the U.S. and appeared
to be the easiest entry destination. The other countries
that Walmart chose as its first global points of entry—

business represents a solid chunk of Walmart’s overall
$482 billion in revenue for the fiscal year 2015.7

With a market capitalization of more than $200 billion
in 2016, Walmart is worth as much as the gross domestic
product of Algeria. Four of America’s 10 richest indi-
viduals are from Walmart’s low-profile Walton family,
which still owns a 40 percent controlling stake. The com-
pany’s portfolio ranges from superstores in the U.S. to
neighborhood markets in Brazil, bodegas in Mexico, the
ASDA supermarket chain in Britain, Japan’s nationwide
network of Seiyu shops, and a controlling stake in South
African retailer Massmart. Walmart sources many of its
products from low-cost Chinese suppliers. The pressure
group China Labour Watch estimates that if it were a
country, Walmart would rank as China’s seventh largest
trading partner, just ahead of the U.K., spending more
than $18 billion annually on Chinese goods.8

Exhibit 3 Walmart International Retail Unit Count (2001–2006)
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Argentina 11 11 11 11 11 11
Brazil 20 22 22 25 149 295
Canada 174 196 213 235 262 278
China 11 19 26 34 43 56
Germany 94 95 94 92 91 88
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 398
Mexico 499 551 597 623 679 774
Puerto Rico 15 17 52 53 54 54
UK 241 250 258 267 282 315
South Korea 6 9 15 15 16 16

Total 1,071 1,170 1,288 1,355 1,587 2,285

Source: Walmart Annual Reports for fiscal years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006.

Exhibit 4 Walmart International Retail Unit Count (2006–2015)
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Argentina 13 21 28 43 63 88 94 104 105
Brazil 299 313 345 434 479 512 558 556 557
Canada 289 305 318 317 325 333 379 389 394
Chile 0 0 197 252 279 316 329 380 404
China 73 202 243 279 328 370 393 405 411
Costa Rica 137 149 164 170 180 200 205 214 217
El Salvador 63 70 77 77 78 79 80 83 89
Guatemala 132 145 160 164 175 200 206 209 217
Honduras 41 47 50 53 56 70 72 75 81
India 0 0 0 1 5 15 20 20 20
Japan 392 394 371 371 414 419 438 438 431
Mexico 889 1,023 1,197 1,469 1,730 2,088 2,353 2,199 2,290
Nicaragua 40 46 51 55 60 73 79 80 86
Puerto Rico 54 54 56 56 55 56 55 56 55
UK 335 352 358 371 385 541 565 576 592
Total 2,757 3,121 3,615 4,112 4,612 5,360 5,826 5,784 5,949

Source: Walmart Annual Reports for fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.2 Walmart’s Global Strategies 281

business in over 145 cities throughout Mexico. Opening
nearly 100 stores in 2015, Wal-Mex has shown no signs
of slowing down. As of 2016, it operated over 2,200
stores in Mexico.14

The rapid growth of Wal-Mex over the last decade has
not been problem-free. A 2012 report by the New York
Times uncovered widespread bribery occurring at the
Wal-Mex executive level, resulting in a three-year-long
corruption investigation by the U.S. Justice Department.
According to the New York Times report, a senior Walmart
lawyer was contacted by a former executive at Walmart
de Mexico in September 2005. In the e-mail and follow-
up conversations, the former executive (later identified as
the lawyer in charge of obtaining construction permits for
Walmart de Mexico) indicated that Walmart de Mexico
had paid bribes for permits throughout the country to fuel
growth prospects. In response, Walmart dispatched inves-
tigators to Mexico City. Those investigators found over-
whelming evidence of bribery and hundreds of suspect
payments totaling more than US$24 million. The investi-
gation also found that Walmart de Mexico’s top execu-
tives had taken steps to conceal the evidence from
Walmart’s headquarters.15  Shortly after the investigation
commenced, Walmart warned shareholders that its reputa-
tion could be affected by the bribery scandal. Shares
dropped by 5 percent in April 2015, representing approx-
imately US$10 billion in value. Walmart noted that inqui-
ries from media and law enforcement could affect the
“perception among certain audiences of its role as a cor-
porate citizen.”16  Between 2012 and 2015, roughly two
dozen representatives from the U.S. Justice Department,
FBI, SEC, and IRS became involved in the investigation.17 
In the wake of the investigation and bribery charges,
Walmart has created a new executive position to ensure
that all Walmart employees are complying with the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.18 

In late 2006 the company was also approved by Mexico’s
Finance Ministry to open its own bank. In a country
where 75 percent of citizens have never had a bank
account due to high fees, “Banco Walmart de Mexico
Adelante” added much-needed competition to the finan-
cial services industry and offered consumers lower fees
than traditional banks.19 In November 2007, Wal-Mex
opened its first consumer bank, Banco Walmart, in Toluca;
by December 2014, the company had opened branches in
2,100 stores. Banco Walmart especially targeted the low-
income market in a country where just 24 percent of
households have savings accounts, compared with 55 per-
cent in Chile. In the short term, this strategy included
luring newcomers with easy instructions and entry points,
like minimum balances of less than $5 and no commis-
sions, compared with $100 minimums at competing
banks. Long term, Wal-Mex’s plans included boosting
sales via debit cards and easing users into more profitable
services like insurance. In 2014 alone, credit card sales

Mexico (1991), Brazil (1994), and Argentina (1995)—were
those with the three largest populations in Latin America.9

The European market had certain characteristics that
made it less attractive to Walmart as a first point of entry.
The European retail industry was mature, implying that a
new entrant would have to take market share away from
an existing player—a very difficult task. Additionally,
there were well-entrenched competitors on the scene (e.g.,
Carrefour in France and Metro A.G. in Germany) that
would likely retaliate vigorously against any new player.
Further, as with most newcomers, Walmart’s relatively
small size and lack of strong local customer relationships
would be severe handicaps in the European arena. In addi-
tion, the higher growth rates of Latin American and Asian
markets would have made a delayed entry into those mar-
kets extremely costly in terms of lost opportunities. In
contrast, the opportunity costs of delaying acquisition-
based entries into European markets appeared to be rela-
tively small.10

While the Asian markets had huge potential when
Walmart launched its globalization effort in 1991, they
were the most distant geographically and different cultur-
ally and logistically from the U.S. market. It would have
taken considerable financial and managerial resources to
establish a presence in Asia.11 However, by 1996, Walmart
felt ready to take on the Asian challenge and it targeted
China. This choice made sense in that the lower purchas-
ing power of the Chinese consumer offered huge potential
to a low-price retailer like Walmart. Still, China’s cultural,
linguistic, and geographical distance from the United
States presented relatively high entry barriers, so Walmart
decided to use two beachheads as learning vehicles for
establishing an Asian presence.12

During 1992–93, Walmart agreed to sell low-priced
products to two Japanese retailers, Ito-Yokado and Yao-
han, that would market these products in Japan, Singa-
pore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. Then, in 1994, Walmart entered Hong Kong
through a joint venture with the C.P. Pokphand Company,
a Thailand-based conglomerate, to open three Value Club
membership discount stores in Hong Kong.13

Success in Mexico and China
Overall, Walmart has had a very successful experience in
Mexico. In 1991 Walmart entered into a joint venture with
retail conglomerate Cifra and opened a Sam’s Club in
Mexico City. In 1997 it gained a majority position in the
company and in 2001 changed the store name to Walmart
de Mexico, or, more commonly, “Wal-Mex.” In addition
to its 256 Walmart Supercenters and 161 Sam’s Club
warehouses, Wal-Mex also operates Bodega food and gen-
eral merchandise discount stores, Superama supermarkets,
and Suburbia apparel stores. The majority of its stores are
located in and around Mexico City; however, it does

282 Part 2 The Role of Culture

high-quality general merchandise and food. Germany was
seen as the largest single base for retailing in Europe.
Wertkauf’s annual sales were about $1.4 billion, and its
stores operated similar to the popular Walmart Super-
center format in the U.S. Walmart’s executives considered
Wertkauf as an “excellent fit” for Walmart and hoped that
it would provide the company with an ideal entry into a
new market.30

However, Walmart’s operations in Germany quickly
turned into a costly struggle. There were a number of
critical factors that the company underestimated when it
entered the new market. First of all, the stores of the
acquired German retail chain were geographically dis-
persed and often in poor locations. Also, Walmart had
faced some serious cultural differences, which it tried to
resolve by making one error after another. For example,
the company initially installed American managers, who
made some well-intentioned cultural gaffes, like offering
to bag groceries for customers (Germans prefer to bag
their own groceries) or instructing clerks to smile at cus-
tomers (Germans, used to brusque service, were put off).31

Other problems, however, were largely outside
Walmart’s control. Two German discounters, Aldi and
Lidl, dominated the grocery business, with smaller shops
that featured cut-rate, though still good-quality, food. Aldi
also heavily promoted one-week sales, featuring deeply
discounted merchandise, ranging from wine to garden
hoses, that draw customers back. While Walmart’s vast
size gave it enormous leverage in purchasing clothing and
other goods, it had to buy much of the food for its German
stores locally. And there, it lacked the muscle of Aldi,
which had 4,100 shops and a presence in nearly every
town in the country.32

“Germany is the home of the discounter,” said Mark
Josefson, a retail analyst at Kepler Securities in Frankfurt.
“Walmart is not competing on price, and that is one of its
main attributes in its home market.” Beyond these com-
petitive pressures, there was another serious factor to con-
sider, namely that the German consumer was one of the
most parsimonious and price-conscious in Europe. Profit
margins in German retailing were the lowest in Europe.33

Walmart struggled in Germany for almost 8 years.
Analysts said that Walmart Germany was losing about
€200 million (£137 million) a year on a turnover of about
€2 billion, despite several attempts to turn around the
business. In 2006 it finally made the decision to withdraw
from the German market, by selling its 85 German stores
to the rival supermarket chain Metro and taking a pre-tax
loss of about $1 billion (£536 million) on the failed ven-
ture.34  The decision to sell out to the Metro Group came
two months after Walmart sold its 16 stores in South
Korea and it appeared a rare retreat by the world’s largest
retailer from its breakneck global expansion.35

In contrast, Walmart’s second retail destination in
Europe, the United Kingdom, has brought the company

grew by 50 percent, with over a half of a million active
credit card users in total. Later that year, Wal-Mex cashed
in on the successes of Banco Walmart by selling the busi-
ness to Inbursa for US$250 million.20,21

Wal-Mex’s plans for future growth involve more heav-
ily targeting the 16–24-year-old age group, which consti-
tutes 55 percent of Mexico’s population. In 2016, Mexico
ranked as Walmart’s number one international destination
with over 2,300 retail outlets, far ahead of its second
major international destination, the United Kingdom,
which had only 600 stores.22 In 2014, Walmart de Mexico
was a top performer globally with a gross margin of 22
percent and 9.7 percent growth in operating income over
the previous year.23

Though not as easy as its experience in Mexico,
Walmart has also found decent success in China. Walmart
entered the Chinese market in 1996 when it opened a
Supercenter and Sam’s Club in Shenzen. As of 2016 the
company had expanded to 433 stores with over 100,000
employees. In order to cater to its Chinese shoppers,
Walmart has introduced “retail-tainment” and attempted
to create a more hands-on shopping experience.24 China’s
Tourism Bureau even named one underground Walmart
store a tourist destination.25

In addition to its own stores, Walmart has had a stake
in the Taiwanese Bounteous Company Ltd., which owned
the popular chain of Trust-Mart stores.26 In late 2006, The
Wall Street Journal publicized a $1 billion deal between
Walmart and Bounteous, in which Walmart would acquire
Trust-Mart’s 100 stores over the course of three years. In
light of Walmart’s slowing U.S. sales and the termination
of its operations in Germany and South Korea, the com-
pany’s expansion in China is quite timely. Like its opera-
tions in Mexico, Walmart has also entered the Chinese
financial service industry, by introducing a credit card
with Bank of Communications Ltd.27

Walmart’s expansion has not gone unnoticed. Domestic
Chinese rivals have also built up their businesses in order
to compete. Shanghai Bailan Group purchased four rival
supermarkets and department stores nearly a decade ago,
now employing over 200,000 and operating over 6,000
stores.28 China Resources Enterprise has hired away man-
agers from foreign chains and cut staff in order to increase
its profitability.29  While these efforts signal greater com-
petition for Walmart in particular, they are necessary for
domestic companies to survive in China’s $4 trillion retail
market, which has been increasingly competitive ever
since the country joined the WTO and dropped restrictions
on foreign retailers.

Mixed Results in Europe and Japan
In 1998 Walmart entered the European market through
Germany by acquiring 21 Wertkauf hypermarkets, one-
stop shopping centers that offered a broad assortment of

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.2 Walmart’s Global Strategies 283

the store. Taking a page from Britain’s ASDA, Seiyu
instead used its marketing dollars to compare prices
against competitors. With the pressure of prolonged reces-
sion, Japanese consumers have finally accepted that they
can buy quality merchandise for a lower price.41  After
spending 100 billion yen (roughly $1.2 billion), Walmart’s
situation in Japan had stabilized by 2010, with two years
of consistent profits.42 As of 2016, Walmart holds at about
440 Seiyu stores across Japan.

Refocusing on Latin America
The year 2005 became another turning point in Walmart’s
strategy. Somewhat frustrated by strategic failure in Ger-
many, and very slow expansion in the developed countries
like Canada and the U.K., the company has turned its
focus toward Latin America. Walmart has decided to
leverage its positive experience in Mexico toward other
South American countries. In 2005 Walmart successfully
entered this market with the purchase of a 33-1/3 percent
interest in Central American Retail Holding Company
(CARHCO) from the Dutch retailer Royal Ahold NV.
CARHCO is Central America’s largest retailer, with
363 supermarkets and other stores in the following five
countries: Guatemala (120), El Salvador (57), Honduras
(32), Nicaragua (30), and Costa Rica (124). CARHCO has
approximately 23,000 associates. Its sales during 2004
were approximately $2.0 billion.43

Prior to that, in March 2004, Walmart bought a
118-store supermarket chain, Bompreco, in northeastern
Brazil for $300 million, also from Royal Ahold of the
Netherlands. This acquisition has significantly increased
Walmart’s competitive position in the country. In 2006 the
company made another successful deal with Portugal-
based Sonae by purchasing its 140 Brazilian stores for
$757 million. The Sonae purchase was expected to boost
Walmart’s presence in Brazil’s wealthier southern states.
With the Sonae acquisition, the Walmart store count
increased to 295 units in 17 of Brazil’s 26 states. How-
ever, this move made Walmart only the third-largest
retailer in Brazil, following Carrefour of France and Com-
panhia Brasileira de Distribuio Po de Acar.44

Brazilian operations, however, have struggled in recent
years. Frustrated by lackluster operating profit margins,
Walmart invested US$22 billion between 2010 and 2015
in capital improvements to spur sales in Brazil. Between
2007 and 2013, the number of Walmart locations across
Brazil doubled. Despite the investment, sales growth con-
tinued to stall. By 2013, Walmart had posted its fifth con-
secutive operating loss in Brazil. In December 2015,
Walmart strategically closed 60 stores across Brazil, rep-
resenting 10 percent of its operations.45

Another step in the sequence of its strategic moves in
Latin America was Walmart’s expansion into Chile. In
2009 Walmart acquired a majority stake of D&S’s (short

much-needed success. Walmart entered the U.K. market
in June 1999 by acquiring ASDA Group PLC, Britain’s
third-largest food retailer. Walmart offered £6.7 billion
($10.8 billion). The cash deal, which topped a rival bid
from the British retail group Kingfisher PLC, was pre-
dicted to double Walmart’s international business at a
stroke and put it in a position to expand its retailing exper-
tise throughout Europe.36

Walmart executives said they hoped to draw upon
ASDA’s management talent and experience. ASDA’s
stores are a little less than half the size of Walmart’s
supercenters of more than 200,000 square feet (18,000
square meters) in the United States, but the lack of space
in much of Europe for new out-of-town shopping develop-
ments could make ASDA’s formula more relevant as a
platform for expansion.37

However, while the chain has been only a moderate
success, delivering consistent results, Walmart has been
frustrated in its efforts to expand, though competing in
Britain’s feverishly competitive supermarket industry has
taught Walmart a good deal. Nevertheless, ASDA is now
something of a center for excellence for its global grocery
sales. The head of global marketing for Walmart is based
at ASDA’s head office in Leeds. And, in an example of
Walmart’s global distribution muscle, The Wall Street
Journal recently reported that the best-selling wine in the
whole of Japan is an own-label ASDA Bordeaux.38

The third major strategic step in Walmart’s early 2000s
global expansion was entering the Japanese market. In
2002 Walmart set foot in Japan with the purchase of a 6
percent stake in the 371-store Seiyu chain. Despite con-
tinued losses, Walmart gradually raised its stake, making
Seiyu a wholly owned subsidiary in June 2008. Walmart
has had to confront numerous issues in Japan, from long-
time Seiyu managers resisting its initiatives to a tendency
among Japanese shoppers to equate low prices with infe-
rior products. Also, bulk deals did not play well in a coun-
try where many lived in small urban apartments, and the
country’s grocery distribution system was populated with
wholesalers who brokered deals between suppliers and
retailers, skimming profits. Even rival Carrefour aban-
doned this market.39

Edward J. Kolodzieski was the man in charge of turn-
ing Seiyu around. As CEO of Walmart Japan, Kolodzieski
has slashed expenses, closed 20 stores, and cut 29 percent
of corporate staff. In-store butchers were removed, with
most meat now processed in a central facility. With the
freed-up floor space, Seiyu bulked up meals-to-go offer-
ings. To bypass the middlemen, Seiyu has also boosted
the number of products it imports directly from manufac-
turers by 25 percent in 2009, and also focused on increas-
ing sales of its own private-label brands.40

The biggest change, however, was a shift away from
weekly specials to “everyday low prices” in areas like
baby care and pet products, and, eventually, throughout

284 Part 2 The Role of Culture

115 new stores, creating 30,000 new jobs. The new stores
will increase Walmart China’s total store count to 530.
Additionally, Walmart will invest US$60 million to
remodel and refresh a portion of the existing Chinese
stores that it operates.51

Rather than being the “largest” retailer in China,
Walmart is aiming to be the most trusted. This long-term
goal includes improving the perceived quality of the
goods it sells. Though online retailer Alibaba still holds
a dominant lead in online market share, part of Walmart’s
strategy includes embracing online sales. In 2012, the
company acquired Yihaodian, an online retailer that sells
perishable goods, and in 2015, Walmart released a cell
phone app to provide consumers with the ability to order
products for either home or in-store delivery.52   

The other attractive growing market from the BRIC group
that also drew Walmart’s attention is India. India is widely
regarded as one of the world’s fastest-growing retail mar-
kets—and one of the most frustrating for foreign retailers.
Despite the liberalization of the Indian economy, foreign
companies are still prohibited from owning a majority
stake in grocery stores. Due to the legal and logistical
difficulties of entering the Indian marketplace, Walmart
has adopted a strategy of partnering with local companies.
Walmart originally joined with the Bharti Group, an
Indian conglomerate, to form a joint venture intended to
open stores under the Best Price Modern Wholesale brand
name. During their five-year partnership, Walmart and the
Bharti Group opened 20 stores in urban centers across
India. Though the partnership was amicably dissolved in
2013, Walmart remains open to using the joint-venture
approach as it expands across the country.53

In the summer of 2015, Walmart announced aggressive
expansion plans with a renewed focus on wholesaling
stores as opposed to traditional retail. While government
restrictions prevent majority ownership of grocery stores
by foreigners, there are no restrictions over wholesalers.
By 2020, Walmart plans to open 50 new stores, more than
tripling its current number. These new stores, acting as a
one-stop shop for a variety of grocery-type items, are tar-
geting small business owners as customers, rather than
everyday consumers. In total, Walmart will invest between
US$240 and US$300 million in the Indian market, creat-
ing 2,000 permanent jobs.54,55,56

Established in 1994 and headquartered in Mississauga,
Ontario, Walmart Canada currently operates 394 stores
and serves more than 1 million customers each day across
Canada. Walmart is Canada’s third-largest employer with
more than 90,000 associates and was recently named one
of Canada’s top ten corporate cultures by Waterstone
Human Capital.57

for Distribución y Servicio) 224-store chain for $1.6 bil-
lion. In acquiring D&S, the nation’s leading grocer and
third-largest retailer, Walmart hopes to cement its domi-
nance in Latin America, where it is by far the biggest
retailer with $38 billion in sales, estimates research firm
Planet Retail, double that of its closest rival, Carrefour. In
Chile, Walmart enters a market that has long been inhos-
pitable to foreign retailers. Home Depot, Carrefour, and
JCPenney are among the companies that have tried, and
failed, to make it in Chile, a nation of 17 million with the
sixth-largest retail market in Latin America.46

Walmart has increased D&S’s expansion budget from
$150 million to $250 million, which would go toward
opening nearly 70 stores in fiscal year 2010, many of
them small stores that cater to lower-income shoppers,
according to Vicente Trius, Walmart Latin America’s …

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