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1. Pleae read article carefully, then write a summary using 150 words, 2. Please find a sentence from article and make close reading of it. Wrote down 150 for this response. 3. Please write down analysis for 1 page (250). 4. write down the outline/ draft of the previous 3 requirements for one page (250). Please read the guideline carefully also! Thank you.


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Writing a Response or Reaction Paper
Each semester, you will probably be asked by at least one instructor to read a book or an article
(or watch a TV show or a film) and to write a paper recording your response or reaction to the
material. In these reports—often referred to as response or reaction papers—your instructor will
most likely expect you to do two things: summarize the material and detail your reaction to it.
The following pages explain both parts of a report.
To develop the first part of a report, do the following:

Identify the author and title of the work and include in parentheses the publisher and
publication date. For magazines, give the date of publication.
Write an informative summary of the material.
Condense the content of the work by highlighting its main points and key supporting
Use direct quotations from the work to illustrate important ideas.
Summarize the material so that the reader gets a general sense of all key aspects of the
original work.
Do not discuss in great detail any single aspect of the work, and do not neglect to mention
other equally important points.
Also, keep the summary objective and factual. Do not include in the first part of the paper
your personal reaction to the work; your subjective impression will form the basis of the
second part of your paper.
To develop the second part of a report, do the following:

Focus on any or all of the following questions. Check with your instructor to see if s/he
wants you to emphasize specific points.

How is the assigned work related to ideas and concerns discussed in the course for
which you are preparing the paper? For example, what points made in the course
textbook, class discussions, or lectures are treated more fully in the work?

How is the work related to problems in our present-day world?

How is the material related to your life, experiences, feelings and ideas? For instance,
what emotions did the work arouse in you?

Did the work increase your understanding of a particular issue? Did it change your
perspective in any way?
Dr. Murray and Anna C. Rockowitz Writing Center, Hunter College, City University of New York

Evaluate the merit of the work: the importance of its points, its accuracy, completeness,
organization, and so on.

You should also indicate here whether or not you would recommend the work to others,
and why.
Here are some important elements to consider as you prepare a report:

Apply the four basic standards of effective writing (unity, support, coherence, and clear,
error-free sentences) when writing the report.

Make sure each major paragraph presents and then develops a single main point. For
example, in the sample report that follows, the first paragraph summarizes the book, and
the three paragraphs that follow detail three separate reactions of the student writer to the
book. The student then closes the report with a short concluding paragraph.

Support any general points you make or attitudes you express with specific reasons and
details. Statements such as “I agree with many ideas in this article” or “I found the book
very interesting” are meaningless without specific evidence that shows why you feel as
you do. Look at the sample report closely to see how the main point or topic sentence of
each paragraph is developed by specific supporting evidence.

Organize your material. Follow the basic plan of organization explained above: a
summary of one or more paragraphs, a reaction of two or more paragraphs, and a
conclusion. Also, use transitions to make the relationships among ideas in the paper

Edit the paper carefully for errors in grammar, mechanics, punctuation, word use, and

Cite paraphrased or quoted material from the book or article you are writing about, or
from any other works, by using the appropriate documentation style. If you are unsure
what documentation style is required or recommended, ask you instructor.

You may use quotations in the summary and reaction parts of the paper, but do not rely
on them too much. Use them only to emphasize key ideas.

Publishing information can be incorporated parenthetically or at the bottom of the page in
a footnote. Consult with your instructor to determine what publishing information is
necessary and where it should be placed.
Dr. Murray and Anna C. Rockowitz Writing Center, Hunter College, City University of New York
Here is a report written by a student in an introductory psychology course. Look at the paper
closely to see how it follows the guidelines for report writing described above.
A Report on Man’s Search for Meaning
Part 1: Summary
Topic sentence for
summary paragraph
Dr. Viktor Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning (New
York: Washington Square Press, 1966) is both an autobiographical
account of his years as a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps and a
presentation of his ideas about the meaning of life. The three years
of deprivation and suffering he spent at Auschwitz and other Nazi
camps led to the development of his theory of Logotherapy, which,
very briefly, states that the primary force in human beings is “a
striving to find a meaning in one’s life” (154). Without a meaning in
life, Frankl feels, we experience emptiness and loneliness that lead
to apathy and despair. This need for meaning was demonstrated to
Frankl time and again with both himself and other prisoners who
were faced with the horrors of camp existence. Frankl was able to
sustain himself partly through the love he felt for his wife. In a
moment of spiritual insight, he realized that his love was stronger
and more meaningful than death, and would be a real and sustaining
force within him even if he knew his wife was dead. Frankl’s
comrades also had reasons to live that gave them strength. One had
a child waiting for him; another was a scientist who was working on
a series of books that needed to be finished. Finally, Frankl and his
friends found meaning through their decision to accept and bear
their fate with courage. He says that the words of Dostoevsky came
frequently to mind: “There is one thing that I dread: not to be
worthy of my suffering.” When Frankl’s prison experience was over
and he returned to his profession of psychiatry, he found that his
theory of meaning held true not only for the prisoners but for all
people. He has since had great success in working with patients by
helping them locate in their own lives meanings of love, work, and
Part 2: Reaction
Topic sentence for first
reaction paragraph
One of my reactions to the book was the relationship I saw
between the “Capos” and ideas about anxiety, standards, and
aggression discussed in our psychology class. The Capos were
prisoners who acted as trustees, and Frankl says they acted more
cruelly toward the prisoners than the guards or the SS men. Several
psychological factors help explain this cruelty. The Capos must
have been suppressing intense anxiety about “selling themselves
out” to the Nazis in return for small favors. Frankl and other
prisoners must have been a constant reminder to the Capos of the
courage and integrity they themselves lacked. When our behaviors
Dr. Murray and Anna C. Rockowitz Writing Center, Hunter College, City University of New York
and values are threatened by someone else acting in a different way,
one way we may react is with anger and aggression. The Capos are
an extreme example of how, if the situation is right, we may be
capable of great cruelty to those whose actions threaten our
Topic sentence for
second reaction
Topic sentence for
third reaction
Concluding paragraph
I think that Frankl’s idea that meaning is the most important
force in human beings helps explain some of the disorder and
discontent in the world today. Many people are unhappy because
they are caught in jobs where they have no responsibility and
creativity; their work lacks meaning. Many are also unhappy
because our culture seems to stress sexual technique in social
relationships rather than human caring. People buy popular books
that may help them become better partners in bed, but that may not
make them more sensitive to each other’s human needs. Where
there is no real care, there is no meaning. To hide the inner
emptiness that results from impersonal work and sex, people busy
themselves with the accumulation of material things. With
television sets, stereos, cars, expensive clothes, and the like, they try
to forget that their lives lack true meaning instead of working or
going to school to get a meaningful job, or trying to be decent
human beings.
I have also found that Frankl’s idea that suffering can have
meaning helps me understand the behavior of people I know. I have
a friend named Jim who was always poor and did not have much of
a family—only a stepmother who never cared for him as much as
for her own children. What Jim did have, though, was
determination. He worked two jobs to save money to go to school,
and then worked and went to school at the same time. The fact that
his life was hard seemed to make him bear down all the more. On
the other hand, I can think of a man in my neighborhood who for all
the years I’ve known him has done nothing with his life. He spends
whole days smoking and looking at cars going by. He is a burnedout case. Somewhere in the past his problems must have become too
much for him, and he gave up. He could have found meaning in his
life by deciding to fight his troubles like Jim, but he didn’t, and now
he is a sad shadow of a man. Without determination and the desire
to face his hardships, he lost his chance to make his life meaningful.
In conclusion, I would strongly recommend Frankl’s book to
persons who care about why they are alive, and who want to truly
think about the purpose and meaning of their lives
Dr. Murray and Anna C. Rockowitz Writing Center, Hunter College, City University of New York
Forum on Miranda FRICKER’s
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
BIBLID [0495-4548 (2008) 23: 61; pp. 69-71]
ABSTRACT: This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007);
and it gives replies to commentators.
Keywords: credibility, testimony, social understanding, prejudice, epistemic injustice, virtue, virtue epistemology.
The overarching aim of Epistemic Injustice is to explore two kinds of dysfunction in our
epistemic practices. The first occurs in testimonial transaction, when a speaker receives a deflated degree of credibility from a hearer owing to prejudice on the hearer’s
part. Many philosophers debate the question exactly how fundamental testimony is as
a source of knowledge, but few would deny that an enormous amount of what we
know is, at root, testimonially acquired. Testimony can be spoken or written, or for
that matter signed or sung; it can be direct, as when someone tells us face to face what
the time is; or indirect, as when we learn about world events from the newspapers.
Since so much of what we know depends on one or another sort of testimonial transaction, it matters whether our habits of attributing credibility are in good order.
Clearly it matters from a purely epistemic point of view: if, for instance, a hearer’s prejudice wrongly deflates her judgement of credibility, then the flow of knowledge is
blocked, truths fail to flow from knower to inquirer. But this is not all. The dysfunction of unduly deflated credibility may be not only an epistemic dysfunction, it may
also be an ethical dysfunction. For the speaker who receives a prejudicially deflated
degree of credibility from a hearer is thereby wronged —he is wronged specifically in his
capacity as a knower. This idea of being wronged in one’s capacity as a knower constitutes my generic characterization of epistemic injustice.
In the book I explore two ways in which someone might be so wronged. The first
is as I have already described: a speaker receives a prejudicially deflated degree of
credibility from a hearer. This I call testimonial injustice, and it wrongs the subject in his
capacity as a giver of knowledge. An example might be that a jury does not believe
someone simply because of the colour of his skin. The second is what I call hermeneutical injustice. This sort of injustice occurs at a prior stage, when someone is trying to
make sense of a social experience but is handicapped in this by a certain sort of gap in
collective understanding —a hermeneutical lacuna whose existence is owing to the
relative powerlessness of a social group to which the subject belongs. Such a lacuna
renders the collective interpretive resources structurally prejudiced. An example of herTHEORIA 61 (2008): 69-71
meneutical injustice might be the difficulty of making sense of homosexual desire as a
legitimate sexual orientation in a cultural-historical context where homosexuality is interpreted as perverse or shameful. In such a context, the gay subject cannot make
proper sense of his sexuality, owing to the fact that gay people as such were prevented
from making a full contribution to collective resources for social meaning, with the result that the forms of understanding available for making sense of homosexuality were
crucially uninformed and distorted. I analyse the wrong done by this kind of injustice
in terms of what I call ‘situated hermeneutical inequality’ —the lived experience of being unfairly disadvantaged in rendering one’s social experiences intelligible, to others
and possibly even to oneself.
Clearly, hermeneutical injustice will show up in attempts at communicative testimonial exchange, and so both these types of epistemic injustice call for a corrective or
ameliorative virtue on the part of the hearer in any such exchange. Accordingly I identify two such virtues: testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice. Most basically, testimonial justice is such that the hearer corrects for any influence of prejudice by reinflating credibility to non-prejudiced levels; and hermeneutical justice is such that the
hearer corrects for any influence of structural prejudice in social-interpretive resources
by adjusting credibility levels appropriately to the hermeneutical handicap incurred by
the speaker. The virtue of testimonial injustice pre-empts the testimonial injustice altogether, since if the hearer corrects for her prejudice to make a non-prejudiced credibility judgement of the hearer, then all is well and no testimonial injustice has occurred. By contrast, the virtue of hermeneutical injustice is after the fact of the hermeneutical injustice itself, but it can ameliorate, even neutralize, the harms associated
with it. In this case, the hearer succeeds in picking up on the fact that the speaker’s
lack of intelligibility is not her fault —it is due to the unfairly impoverished interpretive resources she is working with.
I conceive of both these virtues as contributing something positive to the hearer’s
‘testimonial sensibility’ —his trained sensitivity to the multifarious signs of a speaker’s
degree of epistemic trustworthiness. I argue for a virtue epistemological approach to
testimony, which makes central use of the idea of a testimonial sensibility and which is
developed in parallel to the kind of ethical cognitivism originating in Aristotle which
emphasizes the possibility of a virtuous subject’s perceiving the world in moral colour.
In my account, the virtuous hearer perceives her interlocutor in epistemic colour, as
being to this or that degree trustworthy in what he is asserting. Such an account explains the spontaneous phenomenology of everyday testimonial exchange, but preserves the operation of critical rationality in the hearer even while she spontaneously
accepts what she is told. It thus cuts through the usual stalled dialectic of inferentialism on the one hand, which insists on the operation of critical rationality in the hearer
by demanding some sort of inference on his part, and non-inferentialism on the other,
which eschews all such argumentation on the part of the hearer in favour of an uncritical spontaneity of acceptance.
What is intriguing about both virtues I have characterized is that they display a hybridity of the intellectual and the ethical: each is at once an intellectual virtue and an
ethical virtue. I argue that while many different virtues may share a common ultimate
Theoria 61 (2008): 69-71
end, they are individuated by their distinct immediate ends. Let us analyse the structure of each of our virtues one at a time. First, testimonial justice. Considered as a
purely intellectual virtue it aims ultimately at truth, and more immediately at neutralizing prejudice in one’s credibility judgements. Now, let us consider the same virtue as a
purely ethical virtue. Ultimately it aims at justice, and more immediately it aims at neutralizing prejudice in one’s credibility judgements. Same immediate end, so same virtue. I conclude that testimonial justice is at once an intellectual and an ethical virtue.
Now what about the virtue of hermeneutical justice? Considered purely as an intellectual virtue it aims ultimately at understanding and more immediately at neutralizing the
impact of structural prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource. Considered as
a purely ethical virtue, it aims ultimately at justice and more immediately at neutralizing the impact of structural prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource. Same
immediate end, so same virtue. I conclude that hermeneutical justice too is at once an
intellectual and an ethical virtue.
The hybridity of these two virtues is startling, and thoroughly out of line with the
Aristotelian tradition that conceives ethical and intellectual virtues as fundamentally
different in kind. However, the hybridity is manifest, and on reflection should be unsurprising: any virtue that aims to correct for the impact of prejudice in judgement will
surely display the same hybridity, for prejudice is at once an intellectual and ethical
vice. In both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, the hearer misses out on something epistemically valuable, and the speaker suffers an injustice. The negative hybridity of the vices generates the positive hybridity of the correlative virtues. By studying
the negative space of epistemic injustice, the positive space of epistemic justice is revealed; and so we learn what virtues we may need to cultivate in order to make our
epistemic conduct at once more rational and more just.
Miranda FRICKER is Reader in Philosophy, at Birkbeck, University of London. She did her DPhil at the
University of Oxford (1996), first moving to the University of London to take up a Jacobsen Research
Fellowship and then a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship. Her main areas of interest are in ethics,
epistemology, and in those areas of feminist philosophy that concern social identity, power, and the authority of reason. She is the author of Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP,
2007); Reading Ethics, co-written with Sam Guttenplan (forthcoming, Blackwell, 2008), and she coedited The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (CUP, 2000) with Jennifer Hornsby.
ADDRESS: School of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX. Departmental Office tel: +44 (0)20 7631 6383, fax: +44 (0)20 7631 6564. E-mail: office@philosophy.
Theoria 61 (2008): 69-71

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