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-10 PAGES-use at least 15-20 references please-I have added some of the class readings, if you could try to reference those as well, that would be awesome!Your answer should include:international relations theory or a combination of theories you think best explains the behavior of eachstate in terms of their decision to join the alliance and their decision to maintain it. You should alsoinclude what you believe to be the most convincing alternative explanations and a justification for whyyou think your preferred theory does a better job.If your paper is about the security relationship it should include details, such as:When did the alliance relationship begin? What was the relationship between the two states before thealliance?Provide a brief history of the security aspects of the alliances. Has the U.S. engaged in military conflictwith or against this state?Has the U.S. deployed troops to the country? How many troops has it deployed? Has the number oftroops changed over time? If so, how and why?Does the U.S. keep bases in the country? If so, what is the purpose of the bases?Does the U.S. engage in military exercises with the state?Are the forces interoperable (i.e. do they have similar equipment and training so that they can fight withone another)?What are the primary security benefits for each state? What are the costs associated with therelationship?For the economic relationship, the paper should provide a brief overview of the history of the economicrelationship between the two states:What was the economic relationship between the two states before the alliance? What was it like afterthe alliance?What was the trade relationship and how has it changed over time? What does the state import from itsally? What does it export to its ally? How have these trade flows changes over time?What it the level and direction of Foreign Direct Investment?Do the states loan to each other?Do the states give one another economic or military aid?Are there other economic costs or benefits associated with the relationship?TipsThere is not one correct way to write this paper. This assignment was crafted to allow students freedomto complete the assignment as they choose. Be that as it may, here are some suggestions for you to keepin mind when writing the paper/preparing presentations. One, remember to focus the paper on the initialquestions. Two, although this paper has historical elements, all papers are making some kind ofargument, and all papers need to back up their arguments with evidence. Three, try to reference themajor ideas and theories from the class readings – they will help guide you. Four, the paper should lookorganized and professional. Do your best to avoid spelling and grammar mistakes and include abibliography.
frieden___sectoral_conflict_and_foreign_economic_policy.pdf

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International Organization Foundation
Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940
Author(s): Jeff Frieden
Source: International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1, The State and American Foreign Economic
Policy (Winter, 1988), pp. 59-90
Published by: MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706770
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and foreign
economicpolicy,
Sectoralconflict
1914-1940 JeffFrieden
The periodfrom1914to 1940is one of themostcrucialand enigmatic
in
modernworldhistory,and in the historyof modernU.S. foreignpolicy.
WorldWarI catapultedtheUnitedStatesintointernational
economicand
politicalleadership,
yetintheaftermath
ofthewar,despitegrandiose
Wilsonian plans, the United States quicklylapsed into relativedisregardfor
eventsabroad:itdidnotjoin theLeague ofNations,disavowedresponsibilityforEuropeanreconstruction,
wouldnotparticipate
openlyinmanyinternationaleconomicconferences,
and restoredhighlevelsoftariff
protection
forthedomesticmarket.Onlyinthelate 1930sand 1940s,aftertwenty
years
of bitterbattlesoverforeign
policy,did theUnitedStatesmoveto center
stageof worldpoliticsand economics:it builtthe UnitedNationsand a
stringof regionalalliances,underwrote
therebuilding
of WesternEurope,
almostsingle-handedly
constructed
a globalmonetary
andfinancial
system,
and led theworldin commercial
liberalization.
This articleexaminesthe peculiarevolutionof U.S. foreigneconomic
policyin theinterwar
years,and focuseson theroleofdomesticsocioeconomicand politicalgroupsin determining
foreignpolicy.The American
interwarexperiencepowerfully
demonstrates
thatthe country’sinternationalpositionandeconomicevolutiondo notsufficiently
explainitsforeign
policy.Indeed,althoughthe contoursof theinternational
systemand the
place oftheUnitedStatesinitchangeddramatically
during
andafterWorld
War I, thesechangeshad a verydifferent
impacton different
sectorsof
The authorwouldliketo acknowledge
thecomments
andsuggestions
ofBeverlyCrawford,
RobertDallek,AmyDavis, BarbaraGeddes,Judith
JoanneGowa, StephanHagGoldstein,
gard,JohnIkenberry,
RobertJervis,MilesKahler,Paul Kennedy,RobertKeohane,Charles
Kindleberger,
SteveKrasner,David Lake, MikeMastanduno,
WilliamMcNeil,JohnRuggie,
StephenSchuker,JackSnyder,Arthur
Stein,andRichardSylla.
InternationalOrganization42, 1, Winter1988
? 1988bytheMassachusetts
ofTechnology
andtheWorldPeace Foundation
Institute
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60 International
Organization
Americansociety.WorldWarI dramatically
theoverseasecostrengthened
nomicinterests
of manymajorU.S. banksand corporations,
who fought
hardformorepoliticalinvolvement
by the UnitedStatesin worldaffairs.
Yet domestically
orientedeconomicgroupsremainedextremely
powerful
withinthe United States and soughtto maintaina relativelyisolated
America.Throughthe 1920s and early 1930s,the two broad coalitions
battledto dominateforeigneconomicpolicy.The resultwas an uneasy
in whichthe two campsentrenched
stand-off
themselves
in different
portionsofthestateapparatus,so thatpolicyoftenranon twotracksandwas
sometimesinternally
contradictory.
Onlythe crisisof the 1930sand the
eventualdestruction
of mostof America’soverseascompetitors
led to an
“internationalist”
victory
thatallowedfortheconstruction
oftheAmericanled post-World
War II international
politicaleconomy.
The problem
To virtually
all observersthenand since,at the end of WorldWar I the
UnitedStates seemedto dominatethe international
politicaleconomy.It
hadfinanced
thevictorious
wareffort
andprovidedmostofthewarmateriel
thatwentintoit;itsindustry
was byfartheworld’slargestandmostproductive.Despiteits traditional
economicinsulation,
thesheersize oftheU.S.
economymadethecountry
theworld’slargesttrading
power.The centerof
worldfinancehad shiftedfromLondonto New York. The UnitedStates
clearlyhad themilitary,
industrial,
and financial
capacityto imposeitswill
on Europe. Yet afterWorld War I the UnitedStates, in the current
arcaneiconography
of thefield,did notplaythepartof international
economichegemon,arbiter,and bankroller
oftheworldeconomicorder.The
UnitedStateswas capable of hegemonicaction,and PresidentWoodrow
Wilsonhad hegemonic
plans,buttheyweredefeated.The problemwas not
in Europe,foralthoughtheBritishand Frenchwerestronger
in 1919than
theywouldbe in 1946,theycouldhardlyhavestoodinthewayofAmerican
hegemony.Indeed, European complaintsabout the UnitedStates after
WorldWar I were in muchtheoppositedirection:theEuropeansbitterly
protested
America’s
refusal
toaccepttheresponsibilities
ofleadership.
TheEuropeanschargedthattheUnitedStateswas stingy
withitsgovernment
finance,
hostileinitstradepolicy,scandalous
initsrefusal
tojointheLeagueofNations,
to getinvolvedin overseeingand smoothing
unwilling
Europe’ssquabbles.
The Britishand Frenchtriedfor yearsto enticeand cajole a reluctant
Americaintoleadership.Americawouldnotbe budged,at leastuntil1940.
The world’smostpowerful
nationpursueda contradictory
andshifting
set
offoreign
economicpolicies.The country
bothassertedand rejectedworld
leadership,simultaneously
initiated
andblockedefforts
at Europeanstabilization,andbegansuchmajorcooperative
ventures
as theLeagueofNations
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Sectoralconflict61
in theseAmericaninitiaand theDawes Plan onlyto limititsparticipation
tivesin ultimately
fatalways. The analyticalproblembedevilsbothecoand politicalRealists.For those who believe in the
nomicdeterminists
toexplainwhya United
primacy
ofinternational
powerpolitics,itis difficult
theworldpoliticalsystemwas unwilling
to do so.
Statesable to reconstruct
andforemost,
Forthosewholookat economicaffairs
first
America’sunchallengedpositionas the world’s leadingcapitalexportershouldhave acand international
celeratedthetrendtowardstradeliberalization
monetary
leadershipbegunbeforeWorldWar I; instead,thependulumswungback
towardsprotectionism
and littlepublicU.S. government
involvement
in
international
monetary
issues.
The relevantinternational
relationsliterature,
facedwithsuchanalytical
anomalies,generally
fallsbackon vaguereference
todomesticconstraints
in
explainingU.S. foreigneconomicpolicyin the interwar
period.Charles
whosecomparison
oftheerawiththePax Britannica
Kindleberger,
andPax
Americanais thefoundation
stoneformostinternational
relationsthinking
on theinterwar
to theeffectthat”in
years,citesE. H. Carrapprovingly,
1918,worldleadershipwas offered,
by almostuniversalconsent,to the
UnitedStates. . [and]was declined,”andconcludesthat”theonecountry
capable of leadership[i.e. the UnitedStates]was bemusedby domestic
concernsand stoodaside.”1
Seen fromtheperspectiveof Americandomesticpolitics,however,the
problemis quitereversed.In thecontextoftraditional
Americanapathyor
even hostility
towardsworldaffairs,the interwar
yearssaw an amazing
flurry
of globalactivityby thecountry’spolitical,economic,and cultural
leaders.Againstthebackdropofthelongstanding
indifference
ofmostofthe
Americanpoliticalsystemto eventsabroad,thelevelof overseasinvolvementin the 1920sand 1930sappearsbothstartling
and unprecedented.2
The contradictory
roleoftheUnitedStatesin theinterwar
periodcan be
tracedto theextremely
unevendistribution
ofinternational
economicinterestswithin
Americansociety.America’sinternational
economicpositiondid
changeduringand afterWorldWar1,yetoverseasassetswereaccumulated
by a veryconcentrated
set of economicactors.This leftmostof theU.S.
economyindifferent
toforeign
economicaffairs,
whilesomeofthecountry’s
leadingeconomicsectorswerebothdeeplyinvolvedand deeplyconcerned
withtheinternational
economy.Americanforeign
policywas thustornbetweeninsularity
and internationalism;
the segmentsof the foreign-policy
1. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley: Universityof
California
Press,1973),pp. 297-99.TheCarrcitation
is from
hisTheTwenty
YearsCrisis,19191930(London:Macmillan,1939),p. 234.A popularBritish
satirical
history
ofthe1930s,under
theheading”A Bad Thing,”summarized
theresultsoftheGreatWarsomewhatmoresuccinctly:”Americawas thusclearlytop nation,and Historycame to a .” WalterSellarand
RobertYeatman,1066AndAll That(New York:Dutton,1931),p. 115.
2. Robert Dallek, The American Styleof Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1983) is a good
surveyoftraditional
Americaninsularity.
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62 International
Organization
orientedintereststriedto use
bureaucracythatreflectedinternationally
American
powertoreorganize
theworld’spoliticaleconomy,whileportions
ofthegovernment
tiedto domestically
orientedsectorsinsistedon limiting
America’sinternational
role.The crisisof the 1930sdissolvedmanyofthe
entrenched
intereststhathad keptpolicystalematedand alloweda new
groupofpoliticalleadersto reconstitute
a morecoherentset ofpolicies.
This articlebuildson the workof historians
the interwar
investigating
period3andon thecontributions
ofothersocialscientists
concerned
withthe
relationship
betweenthe international
and domesticpoliticaleconomies.
The work of Charles Kindleberger
and PeterGourevitch,amongmany
others,has shownthe importanceof sectoraleconomicinterestsin explainingdomesticpoliticsand foreign
policymaking
in advancedindustrial
societies.BothGourevitch
and ThomasFergusonhave used a sectoralapproachto elucidatedomesticand international
eventsin the 1930s.The
presentarticleis thusan attempt
to buildon existing
sectoralinterpretations
of modernpoliticaleconomies,and an extensionof theapproachto problemsin international
relations.4
The argument
summarized
Between1900and 1920,theUnitedStateswentfroma positionofrelative
international
economicinsignificance
tooneofpredominance.
A majorinter3. Thehistorical
literature
ontheperiodis so enormous
thatitis feasibleonlytocitethemost
recentimportant
additions.Two reviewessaysand a forum
are a goodstart:KathleenBurk,
“EconomicDiplomacyBetweentheWars,”Historical
Journal
24 (December1981),pp. 100315; JonJacobson,”Is Therea New International
Historyofthe1920s?”American
Historical
Review88 (June1983),pp. 617-45;and CharlesMaier,StephenSchuker,and CharlesKindleberger,
“The Two PostwarEras and the ConditionsforStability
in Twentieth-Century
Western
Europe,”American
HistoricalReview86 (April1981).Otherimportant
worksinclude
Denise Artaud, La question des dettes interallieeset la reconstructionde l’Europe (Paris:
Champion, 1979); Frank Costigliola,AwkwardDominion: AmericanPolitical, Economic, and
Cultural Relations with Europe 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984);
Michael J. Hogan, InformalEntente: The Private Structureof Cooperation in Anglo-American
EconomicDiplomacy,1918-1928(Columbia:University
of MissouriPress, 1977);Melvyn
Leffler,TheElusive Quest: America’s PursuitofEuropean Stabilityand FrenchSecurity,1919-
1933 (Chapel Hill: University
of NorthCarolinaPress, 1979);WilliamMcNeil,American
Moneyand the WeimarRepublic(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 1986);Stephen
Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe (Chapel Hill: Universityof North
Carolina Press, 1976); and Dan Silverman,ReconstructingEurope afterthe Great War (Cam-
bridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1982).Manyoftheleadingscholarsin thefieldsummarize
their views in Gustav Schmidt, ed., Konstellationen InternationalerPolitik 1924-1932
(Bochum,W. Ger.: Studienverlag
Dr. N. Brockmeyer,
1983).
4. CharlesKindleberger,
“GroupBehaviorand International
Trade,”JournalofPolitical
Economy59 (February1951),pp. 30-46; PeterGourevitch,
“International
Trade,Domestic
Coalitions,
andLiberty:Comparative
Responsesto theCrisisof 1873-1896,”Journal
ofInterdisciplinary
History8 (Autumn1977),pp. 281-313;PeterGourevitch,
“BreakingwithOrthodoxy:the Politicsof EconomicPolicy Responsesto the Depressionof the 1930s,”
International
Organization
38 (Winter1984),pp. 95-129;ThomasFerguson,
“FromNormalcy
to New Deal: Industrial
Structure,
PartyCompetition,
andAmerican
PublicPolicyintheGreat
Depression,”International
Organization
38 (Winter1984),pp. 41-94.
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Sectoralconflict63
nationalborrower
andhostofforeign
directinvestment
before1900,by 1920
the UnitedStateswas the world’sleadingnew lenderand foreigndirect
investor.The development
of Americanoverseasinvestments
was in itself
and in thistheUnited States simplyrepeatedthe experienceof
unsurprising,
otherdevelopedcountries.Yet the rapidityof the country’sshiftfroma
majorcapitalimporter
andraw-materials
to theleadingexporter
exporter
of
capital,largelybecause of thepeculiarities
oftheinternational
economyin
the ten yearsafter1914,was quite extraordinary.
Even as a few major
Americaneconomicactorswerecatapulted
intoglobaleconomicleadership,
mostof theeconomyremainedas inward-looking
as ever.Thisdivisionin
Americaneconomicorientation
was at therootoftheforeign-policy
problemsofthe 1920sand 1930s.
As American
andfinance
matured
andthecountry
industry
becamericher
in
capital,manylargeAmericancorporations
and bankslooked abroadfor
marketsand investment
opportunities.
UnitedStatesoverseasinvestment
thusgrewgradually
fromthe1890suntiltheeve ofWorldWarI. As Table I
indicates,Americanforeigndirectinvestment
was appreciableby 1900;it
was concentratedin raw materialsextractionand agriculturein the
Caribbeanbasin. By 1912,foreigndirectinvestment
was quitesubstantial
andoverseaslendinghadbecomeofsomeimportance;
thefocuswas stillthe
Caribbeanarea.
The gradualexpansionofAmericanoverseasinvestment,
especiallyoverseas lending,
was givena tremendous
shovebyWorldWarI. Thewarforced
severalbelligerent
countriesto borrowheavilyfromtheUnitedStates,and
previousborrowersfromEuropean capital marketsnow turnedto the
UnitedStatesto satisfy
theirneedsforcapital.As Table 1 shows,American
holdingsofforeign
bondssoaredfromless than5 percentoftotalAmerican
holdingsof non-government
bonds in 1912to nearly17 percentin 1922.
Foreigndirectinvestment
also grewrapidly,as Europeanpreoccupation
withwar and reconstruction
clearedthewayformanyAmericancorporationsto expandfurther
intotheThirdWorldand, afterthewarended,in
Europe itself.The 1920s saw a continuation
of the wartimeincreasein
overseasAmericanlendingand investment.
Americanoverseasinvestment
inindustrial
production-especially
manufacturing
andutilities-andpetroleumgrewparticularly
rapidly.
By 1929Americanoverseasprivateassets-directand portfolio
investments,alongwithotherassortedlong-and short-term
assets-were twentyone billiondollars.Overseasinvestments
in 1929wereequivalentto over
one-fifth
of thecountry’sgrossnationalproduct,a level thatwas reached
againonlyin 1981.5
Although
America’soverseasinvestments
weresubstantial
by the1920s,
theywereveryunevenlydistributed
amongimportant
sectorsof theU.S.
5. Forfigures
on U.S. foreign
privateassets,see Raymond
Goldsmith,
A StudyofSavingsin
theUnitedStates,vol. 1 (Princeton,
N.J.:Princeton
University
Press,1955),p. 1093.
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64 International
Organization
TABLE 1. Indicatorsof theimportance
of U.S. foreigninvestment,
1900-1939(in millionsof dollarsand percent)
1900
1. U.S. foreign
directinvestment
2. Domestic corporateand
agricultural
wealtha
3. Row 1 as a percent
ofRow 2
4. U.S. foreign
bondholdingsb
5. U.S. holdingsof
non-govemnment
bondsc
6. 4/5,percent
1912
1922
1929
1933
1939
751
2,476
5,050
7,850
7,000”
6,750
37,275
75,100
131,904
150,326
109,375
119,324
2.0%
3.3%
3.8%
5.2%
6.4%
159d
623
4,000
7,375
5,048′
2,600g
5,151
14,524
23,687
38,099
37,748
32,502
3.1%
4.3%
16.9%
19.4%
13.4%
8.0%
5.7%
a. Net reproducible
tangiblewealthof U.S. corporations
andagriculture.
b. Due to thedifferent
sourcesused,figures
hereconflict
withthosein Table4; thoseof
Table 4 are probablymorereliable,butto ensurecomparability
Goldsmith’s
figures
are used
throughout
thetable.
c. Excludesonlyholdingsofsecurities
issuedby U.S. federal,state,or localgovernments.
d. Includesstocks(for1900only).
e. Author’sestimates.
f. Figuresare for1934,fromForeignBondholders
Protective
Council,AnnualReportfor
1934(Washington,
D.C.: FBPC, 1935),p. 224.Thisincludesonlybondsbeingserviced;a
morereasonablemeasurewouldincludethemarket
valueofbondsin default.Ifthisaveraged30% ofparvalue,figures
for1933-34wouldbe $5,954millionand 15.8%forrows4
and 6, respectively.
g. Figuresfor1939holdings
offoreign
bondsarefromGoldsmith
andare probably
understated.
Sources. Foreign investment:Raymond Goldsmith,A Studyof Saving in the UnitedStates,
vol. 1 (Princeton,
N.J.:Princeton
University
Press,1955),p. 1093.
Domesticdata: RaymondGoldsmith,
RobertLipsey,andMorrisMendelson,
Studiesin the
National Balance Sheet of the United States, vol. 2 (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity
Press,1963),pp. 72-83.
was
economy.Tables 2 and 3 illustratethat,whileoverseasinvestment
and
industrial
some
the
financial
secfor
extremely
important
community
American
assetswereinsignificant.
tors,mostothersectors’foreign
foreign
both
and
were
in
and
investments mining petroleum
considerable, absolutely
activitieswithinthe United
relativeto capitalinvestedin corresponding
to corporawas also ofgreatrelativeimportance
States.Foreigninvestment
electrical
in
tions machinery
and equipment(especially
appliances),motor
these
Yet
vehicles,rubberproducts,and chemicals.
sectors,whichacin manufacturing,
countedforwelloverhalfofall overseasinvestment
repreof the country’smanufacturing
sentedbarelyone-fifth
plant; far more
in overseasproduction.
werequiteuninvolved
Americanindustries
lendhadmajorforeign
Although
onlya fewindustries
operations,
foreign
on WallStreet.As Table 3 shows,between1919
ingwas a favorite
activity
and 1929new foreigncapitalissues in New York averagedover a billion
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Sectoralconflict65
Foreign directinvestmentand book value offixed capital of
selected U.S. industries,1929 (in millionsof dollars and percent)
TABLE 2.
A
Foreign direct
investment
B
Book value of
fixed capital
A/Bin
percent
Miningandpetroleumab
$2,278
$12,886
17.7%
Publicutilities,
transport
andcommunications
1,625
41,728c
Manufacturing
1,534
23,672
Sector
Machinery
and equipment
Motorvehicles
Rubberproducts
Chemicals
Foodstuffs
Lumberand products
Metalsand products
Textilesandproducts
Stone,clayand glassproducts
Leatherand products
Agriculture’
444
184
60
130
222
69
150
71
23
4
875
3.9%
6.5%
1,907
1,232
434
1,497
4,001
2,001
4,788
2,932
1,451
269
23.3%
14.9%
13.8%
8.7%
5.5%
3.4%
3.1%
2.4%
1.6%
1.3%
51,033
1.5%
a. Figuresfortotalmanufacturing
refining,
whichis includedunder
do notincludepetroleum
“Miningand petroleum.”
b. Figuresfordomesticmining
and petroleum
investedcapitalare forthebookvalueofcapworking
capital.
italincluding
landbutexcluding
c. Value ofplant …
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