You are to choose one of the following discussion questions to answer. Let’s have an array of questions please so early in the week, choose a question and stake your claim with a placeholder forum topic. When answering your question, please make sure you indicate which question you are answering in your post.Thinking about the period 1995-2000 …1. Debate the importance of US involvement in the UN.2. If you had the power to change a Resolution in the UN, what would you have done differently in Angola and why?3. Debate whether or not the OAS should have had a role in the Guatemala crisis.4. Is re-entrenchment a policy the United Nations should follow? Yes/No, Explain. Give Examples.5. A few years ago President Obama addressed the Indian Parliament and stated that India should become a permanent member of the Security Council. Argue for or against India as a permanent member.6. Debate the effectiveness of ultimatums. (This might be a bit of foreshadowing with the Spanish – Catalonia crisis. Could be used an example of how these crises rise to the level of UN involvement.)7. On the road towards peacekeeping and peace-building, is force required if a country does not comply with the stipulations set forth by the international community?8. As the UN Secretary General of the UN, what precautions do you give to NGOs as they enter into a hostile area? Will you back these NGOs up if they get into trouble?Remember to read your texts, watch the videos, and read any other materials in Week 4 Lessons. Include those ideas in your discussions. I look forward to reading your posts and providing feedback on your topics!Instructions: Your initial post should be at least 350 words. Please respond with 3 follow-up posts for full credit in participation. Responses should be a minimum of 150 words. The initial required post should be supported by course readings using parenthetical references. Click here for a copy of the discussion rubric. Follow the Turabian Quick Guide style for author/date. Click on the tab in the middle of the page.
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Questions and ideas to consider:
1. Why was there a decrease in peacekeeping missions between 1994 and 1996?
2. What is genocide? How does one determine when a state has committed genocide?
3. Do setbacks in missions hurt the credibility of the United Nations?
4. How important is US support of the UN?
5. Discuss how peacekeeping changed from 1995-1999.
Please read the summaries of these important peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.
Haiti 1993 Peacekeeping Mission Summary
Guatemala Peace Process 1996-2000 Summary
Uganda-Rwanda Mission Summary
UNPF Peacekeeping Mission Summary for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia
UNTAES Peacekeeping Mission Summary for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
This week’s reading focuses on the
period of the mid-1990s, a time when the former Yugoslavia began to recover from the
violent conflict after the end of the Cold War. The period also included the end of the
mission in Haiti, the Rwanda genocide, and the Guatemala peace process that lasted from
1996-2000. All these missions ended at time when peacekeeping had become too
costly. Patrick Morgan, in a text outlined security of the period, titles one section of his text
“seeking cheap victories” which reflects the tenor of the 1990s. No one wanted to get
bogged down in a long-standing peacekeeping operation – yet the problems of genocide
forced the UN into conflicts that were both costly and ineffective.
There’s a process in peacekeeping that is important to keep in mind as you read your
materials this week. The natural flow in peacekeeping is peace enforcement, peace
imposition, and then peacebuilding. These functions are meant to be sequential as outlined
in the UN charter. Yet beginning in the 1990s, the picture became blurry as to what
constituted peacekeeping as a whole – and specifically, peace enforcement.
Think about all conflict resolution as
lying on a spectrum. It’s a long thin line that begins with talking, goes through various stages
of negotiation and mediation, until the conflict becomes so intense and unavoidable between
the parties that it erupts into violence. At the very far end of the spectrum, after the violent
conflict has occurred, sits the processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding. As an actor,
the United Nations can step in at any point in the conflict resolution process. Genocide or
issues that might lead to genocide are relatively easy to anticipate in terms of whether the
UN intervenes. You’ve read about the obstacles to intervening in the affairs of states – yet
with genocide, there is no obstacle. Under the concept of peremptory norms (meaning
behaviors that are prohibited by all states within the system), genocide may be addressed
wherever it’s found.
Check out this interactive timeline of the genocide in Rwanda.
After Rwanda in 1994, all antennas were up within the international community to make sure
genocide would be caught early enough to be stopped – or the warning signs could be
interpreted to understand that genocide was imminent without a UN
intervention. Peacekeeping as an approach to conflict resolution generally occurs when
violent conflict is an issue – as Morgan says “when war seems about to occur or already has”
(Morgan 2006, 209). Think about two schoolyard rivals who day after day are on the edge of
beating each other up. If a third party is watching, maybe an adult who’s supervising the
playground, then with some experience in what kids do in schoolyards, the adult can step in
and break up behavior that might end with a fistfight. If those signs are missed, and the kids
start slugging it out, then at some point they probably want to stop fighting but don’t know
how to get out of the mess. That’s a good time for the adult to come in and pull them apart,
The schoolyard fight and when to
intervene is a good analogy but there’s also an important point that the UN only intervenes
when the welfare of the people is at stake – people “caught up in the conflict, the region, or
the global system” (Morgan 2006, 209). Again, the intervention can occur at any point in the
conflict resolution process. Peacekeeping is primarily when the parties have agreed to stop
fighting – they’ve been pulled apart or have been told sternly, “stop what you’re doing” in
schoolyard talk – yet the issue that caused the conflict in the first place still is not
settled. That’s when peacekeeping is at its best. “Peacekeeping is the insertion of outside
military forces that are intended to use nonmilitary means to help the parties behave
peacefully” (Morgan 2006, 210). It’s important to keep the image of the schoolyard as a
whole – to keep peace and security with that playground by breaking up or preventing the
bullies from fighting.
Watch President Clinton’s 1995 address on peace in Bosnia. What was the role of the UN
peacekeeping mission after the conflict ended?
As you’ve read in our previous weeks’ reading and in your previous course on peacekeeping,
there are classic principles of peacekeeping that are held in high regard, no matter the
conflict. Morgan terms this “keeping the honest peace” (Morgan 2006, 213).
1. The intervention has to be carried out for the welfare of everyone in the society. You
cannot pick and choose where the intervention will occur or who it will help at a
granular level. The intervention goes in – and everyone gains.
2. Peacekeeping has to be impartial. This is one of the most difficult aspects of
peacekeeping, because it may be obvious that a dictatorship or ruling elite regime
may be the instigators of all the conflict in the society. Yet once the peacekeeping
force is in operation, impartiality has to drive it.
3. The third principle is that everyone has to be on board with what the peacekeepers
are there to do. The parties really want to stop fighting and they want the
peacekeepers there. This is more difficult than it seems. Sometimes peacekeeping
is just “tolerated” by one party because something else may be gained. “Some
analysts, reflecting on the Bosnian case, have suggested that being welcomed by the
parties may not be enough, though. They feel it is important that the local population
actively supports the peacekeepers and wants them there” (Morgan 2006, 231).
You’ve read these principles before in your classroom readings, but it’s important with this
week’s case studies to really keep those principles in mind. The 1990s were a time when
people began to have access to information at a very specific level. Cable news was
ubiquitous – CNN was everywhere. The media itself had an enormous influence over a
society’s acceptance of the peacekeeping mission sent to facilitate its conflict resolution. In
fact, the idea of a CNN effect on governments “to do something” cannot be overestimated in
the 1990s (Morgan 2006, 240). Over time, peacekeeping evolved conceptually – from
simple observing and verifying that the peace agreement was being carried out, to providing
a buffer, to offering humanitarian assistance, and finally actually being an agent of law and
Within the general purview of
peacekeeping, then, UN missions have evolved to a level that most of what they do is peace
enforcement and peace imposition. As you’ve read in your other classes, there are
numerous actors in the world system who can observe or provide a buffer between parties
(think of the Helsinki Watch Groups or Amnesty International), and there are multitudes of
NGOs that can provide humanitarian assistance. Yet because violent solutions to conflict is
the monopoly of states and the institutions they create (like the UN), then the enforcement of
law and order is primarily where peacekeeping has gone since the case studies you’re
reading about this week. These studies were the catalysts to change in peacekeeping.
Morgan describes peace enforcement and peace imposition as “overlapping phenomena”
(Morgan 2006, 230). He argues that each function involves a third party saying “We’re here
to promote peace. And if you don’t stop fighting we’ll kill you if we have to” (Morgan 2006,
230). Peace enforcement, Morgan suggests, is like “calling out the National Guard to halt a
riot or other violent demonstration when appeals by the community leaders . . . are having
little effect” (Morgan 2006, 231). Peace imposition comes next, to make sure that the one
party refusing to stop fighting will do so. An analogy might be “authorities go beyond calling
out the National Guard to declare martial law that puts the armed forces in control of an
entire area” (Morgan 2006, 231).
As you read the case studies in the primary document links, think about where they each fell
in operation along the conflict resolution spectrum. Could someone predict the effectiveness
of the UN intervention based on when and how the intervention occurred – how well it
adhered to the principles of peacekeeping and what tools of peace enforcement and peace
imposition it required?
Morgan, Patrick M. 2006. International Security: Problems and Solutions. Washington,
DC: CQ Press.
In order to understand the degree to which a peacekeeping mission is effective, we must
understand the actions and dynamic of involved global actors as well as those of the country
in crisis. In David Ucko’s article “Dealing with Retrenchment”, he states that there are
commonalities among social and political institutions and global actors that play an integral
role in managing a nation’s transition from war-to-peace. He recognizes that many
institutions either cannot logistically support peacekeeping efforts or do not issue clear
mandates to enforce peace. 3 Ucko’s conclusions align with Autesserre’s statements in his
article titled “The Crisis of Peacekeeping” which in he states that “UN peacekeeping
missions fail because they rely on top-down solutions rather than bottom-up strategies that
draw on local knowledge.”1
To answer this week’s forum prompt, I decided to focus on the Burundi Ultimatum. This
focuses on ultimatums issued within a country that have led to a United Nations (UN) led
intervention and punitive measures from the International Criminal Court (ICC) rather than
analyzing the outcomes of UN initiated sanctions. The Burundi Ultimatum was issued in _ by
the Burundian President Nkurunziza in the attempt to seek a third term in office. The
ultimatum would last for five days and called for citizens to turn over their “illegal” firearms
to the government or be considered enemies of the state. This ultimatum drew an alarmed
response from the international community, deeming it to be unconstitutional. The United
Nations foresaw that President Nkurunziza’s actions would trigger further bloodshed since
armed militants would resolve to forceful methods of obtaining arms. Nkurunziza also
promised in his statements that his security forces would “use violent methods to search
home for weapons” and members of the opposition after the five day period. This dangerous
rhetoric was a full endorsement of violence against the Burundian people which would only
incite greater conflict and worsen the humanitarian crisis.2
According to Human Rights Watch, the United Nations responded to the Burundian
humanitarian crisis by leveraging the UN Commission of Inquiry to investigate the internal
executive practices of Nkurunziza in September 2015. However, Burundi would not cooperate
with the commission, even to the extent of curbing punitive measures from the International
Criminal Court (ICC). When the International Criminal Court authorized an investigation into
the crimes committed in Burundi, the country decided to withdraw their membership from the
ICC. On October 27, 2017, Burundi became the first country to withdraw from the ICC. In 2016,
the UN Security Council drafted a resolution to deploy over 200 UN police officers to Burundi.
President Nkurunziza initially rejected this intervention and continued to do so until 2017
when the resolution was finally implemented.4
Essentially, we can come to the conclusion that peacekeeping efforts involve the consensual
participation of all parties involved. In Burundi’s case, the President circumvented multiple
attempts of international interference and condemnation from the International Criminal
Court. Adding this to the social division, resulting in a civil war which created a state of nonagreement between the Burundian people, we can see why sustainable peace has failed in
Burundi. There is no clear defined national strategy of social justice and anti-war which
ultimately blocks the effectiveness of international intervention. If a nation’s people cannot
unanimously agree and collectively support the peacekeeping process, than international
intervention would prove to be fruitless.
 Autesserre, Séverine. “The Crisis of Peacekeeping.” Foreign Affairs. January 29, 2019.
Accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisispeacekeeping.
 Charbonneau, Louis. (2019) U.S. fears Burundi ultimatum will trigger violence this
weekend. Reuters. November 5, 2015. U.S. Accessed April 24,
 Ucko, David, and David Ucko. “Dealing with Retrenchment.” Medium. July 20, 2010.
Accessed April 24, 2019. https://medium.com/kings-of-war/dealing-with-retrenchmentf34dd8a030d3.
 “World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Burundi.” Human Rights Watch. January 18, 2018.
Accessed April 24, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/burundi
2. If you had the power to change a Resolution in the UN, what would you have done differently
in Angola and why?
The Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA) agreed to and signed the Peace Accords for Angola on 31 May 1991, and then the
Lusaka Protocol, which was signed on 20 November 1994.
According to the article that I used for reference, UNAVEM III’s mandates were to -Provide
good offices and mediation to the Angolan parties; monitor and verify the extension of State
administration throughout the country and the process of national reconciliation;
To supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and to monitor the cease-fire; To
verify information received from the Government and UNITA regarding their forces, as well as
all troop movements;
To assist in the establishment of quartering areas; To verify the withdrawal, quartering and
demobilization of UNITA forces; To supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments;
To verify the movement of Government forces (FAA) to barracks and the completion of the
formation of FAA;
To verify the free circulation of persons and goods; To verify and monitor the neutrality of the
Angolan National Police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police,
and security arrangements for UNITA leaders;
To coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace
process, as well as participating in mine-clearance activities; To declare formally that all
essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential elections have been
fulfilled, and to support, verify and monitor the electoral process.1
With this rather extensive list, the force put together to enforce the mandate was
underequipped and under manned. By February 1995, the 7000 man force was established to
conduct the mission in increments, and fell short in many of the areas, strictly because the
mandate was so broad spectrum.2
The successes of the mandate were under achieved, but the mission can be counted as
successful, because of the steps forward, and successful points that were achieved. This then laid
the course for the road ahead when the Security Council retailored the mission and force to
continue on the road forward.3
If I were to change anything about the Mandate, I would have written the goals in more of a
benchmark method, and tailor the force in a more specific configuration, with a shorter mandate,
with less goals. From the interference from the Cubans, to the interjection of the mercenary and
UNITA forces, who were continuing to work behind the scenes, the governmental interaction
was behind schedule, and the focus began to lose momentum, because of such broad spectrum
On the whole, the mission was successful, but it was more because of the fact that the fighting
was pretty much over by the interaction with the United Nations, leading to a more focused
Peacekeeper and Humanitarian assistance roll.
By June of 1996-1997, the force was then retailored for Peace enforcement, and humanitarian
assistance which then lead to more internal domestic efforts by The Government of Angola,
(1) Department of Public Information, Angola – UNAVEM III United Nations, UNITED
NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION III, peacekeeping.un.org., 1997, Accessed April
Department of Public Information.”Angola – UNAVEM III United Nations, UNITED
NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION III.” peacekeeping.un.org. 1997. Accessed
April 25, 2019.https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unavem_p.htm.
While the article that we were supposed to read on retrenchment this week was very informative I
want to start offering up my own simplified cut and dry definition retrenchment when applied to UN
operations. Retrenchment is the reduction in operations in order to minimize risk exposure. This
risk can be anything from financial, human lives or political capital.
In our reading David Ucko asks “Is retrenchment institutionally fatal?” To this I must answer most
definitely. This is for two reasons, first, the actors who are most interested in the implementation of
an retrenchment policy are most likely to one with the most to gain from the weakening of that
organization. Second, retrenchment forces an organization to sacrifice foundational values in order
to acquiesce to the retrenchment policies. These are most applicable when defining retrenchment
within a political system.
Taking a look at the nations around the world right now how many have human rights abuses that
should be intervened on. Using the website HRW.org (Human Rights Watch) we can quickly
find. North Korea and the systemic use of violence on women in their daily lives to the forced labor
camps being used to sustain economies and keep the general population living in a state of fear
(1) China has arbitrarily imprisoned 1 million people of a minority population, yet when it was
brought up within a UN meeting they did not respond with promises to improve their track
record. Rather, they responded with threats and developed propaganda campaigns to attempt to
rehabilitate their image within the UN and on the International stage (2). In Russia LGBT
mistreatment has become an issue and support has been so broad that a gay propaganda ban (gay
propaganda can include telling someone you are gay) has support across the nation at 88%
(3)(4). Even in the United States, where the policy of separation in and of itself is illegal, according
to the UN, (5) the detention has caused the deaths of children due to mistreatment and malnutrition
while in US custody (6)
None of these previous examples have been acted on in the traditional sense of intervention. The
policy of retrenchment has created an environment where the UN is to weak or does not have
enough impartiality to act when the offender is politically / economically / or militarily powerful. In
theory when the UN should be a body impartial to the rest of the world’s needs. When countries like
Russia China or the United States are acting inappropriately the UN should be able to implement
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