Chat with us, powered by LiveChat ECO498 Intellectual Property Rights Outline Assignment | Abc Paper

As I mentioned in the title the subject will be about -Intellectual Property Rights-. Please follow the instructions on the rubric. I only need what was explained for the outline and please let me know if you have any questions. I have attached the rubric and an article to help with the work. Note: I only need the outline that is due 4/17 showing on the schedule.


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ECO 498 Rubric for Outline and Final Paper
Paper Outline Due 04/17
1. Write out your hypothesis or theme
2. Identify the papers you will be
including in your literature review.
3. Identify the major headings and
subheadings you will be using in
your paper.
4. Identify how you will divide the
5. Identify what style you will be using
for citations/references.
Research Paper Due 05/06
Introduction (1-2 pages)
Content (6- 8 pages)
Conclusion (1-2 pages)
References (as needed)
This should be very brief, about 2 to 3 sentences and
should clearly define the question or issue you are
trying to analyze and explain in your paper.
You are required to use ten (10) quality
papers/articles/studies that are relevant, meaningful,
important, and valid for your topic. Please have these
identified in your outline.
Organize your paper into major themes, types of
methodologies used, major trends in the thinking,
major conclusions. For the outline, you only need to
provide headings/subheadings to indicate the flow of
your paper.
If you are working in a team, clearly note who will be
researching/writing which parts of the paper.
This may depend on your topic since different social
sciences use different styles.
1. Clearly indicate the importance of the subject. (Motivation)
2. Briefly outline the work that has been done in the field.
3. Briefly outline any major controversies that remain in the
4. Sum up the ‘state of the art’ of the research in the field.
5. End with your selected hypothesis/purpose/theme
1. Identify and explain the major themes in the literature.
2. Identify the major trends and findings in the literature.
3. Identify where the researchers agree or don’t agree.
4. Identify any gaps, inconsistencies, contradictions in the
5. Review the major methodologies used and identify
assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses.
6. Provide constructive analysis on the approaches used by
1. Summarize the evidence presented in the literature and
show its significance.
2. Suggest practical applications in the real world.
3. Suggest possible areas for future research.
1. Choose a style and be consistent.
Journal of Human Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development: historical lessons and emerging
Ha-Joon Chang is with the Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of
As will become clearer later in the paper, the role of intellectual property
rights (IPR) in economic development has always been a controversial issue.
However, the debate surrounding it has become even more heated after the
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. Initially, TRIPS
was not even a central issue in the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks that
led to the birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Siebeck, 1990a),
and therefore did not get much attention. A number of recent events,
however, have come together to make people realize that this could become
the biggest point of contention in the running of the WTO in the coming
The Žrst thing that drew people’s attention to TRIPS was the fact that
the ‘transition’ period allowed for the developing countries to ‘upgrade’
their IPR regimes in accordance with the TRIPS agreement was coming to
an end, exposing them to greater dangers of trade sanctions by the advanced
countries (end of 2000 except for the least developed countries, which were
given until 2006). Second, many people were recently enraged by attempts
by advanced country individuals and Žrms to patent products embodying
knowledge that is commonly known in some developing countries on the
back of the TRIPS provision (e.g. the notorious turmeric case; see UNDP,
1999, pp. 70–71). Third, the recent controversy surrounding the attempts
by pharmaceutical companies based in advanced countries to block the
exports of cheap HIV/AIDS drugs by some developing countries (such as
Argentina, India, Thailand, and Brazil) using TRIPS has highlighted the
potential conict between TRIPS and greater human well-being.
TRIPS, like other WTO agreements, is an agreement on a legal framework, so its detailed modus operandi needs to be worked out through the
accumulation of cases. For this reason, the exact future shape of the TRIPS
regime cannot be predicted with certainty at this point. However, as the
aforementioned examples show, the system seems to be evolving in a way
that favours the advanced country producers over everyone else (e.g.
ISSN 1464-9888 print/ISSN 1469-9516 online/01/020287-23 € 2001 United Nations Development Programme
DOI: 10.1080/14649880120067293
H.-J. Chang
consumers in the advanced and the developing countries, developing country
producers). Therefore, it is an opportune time to re-think the implications
of TRIPS and see whether and how it should be changed in a way that
increases the welfare of all.
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by re-thinking the role of
IPR in economic development and drawing some implications of such rethinking for a reform of the TRIPS agreement. A novel feature of the paper
is that it tries to do this from a historical perspective as well as from the
point of view of contemporary developing countries. The next section will
discuss the role that IPR played in the development of the now-developed
countries when they were industrializing, and draw some implications for
the developing countries of today and for the world economy as a whole.
The third section provides a discussion on the role of IPR in economic
development in the contemporary context, with a special emphasis on the
patent system. This is followed by a fourth section critically examining the
implications of TRIPS in light of the preceding discussion. The Žnal section
summarizes and concludes the paper.
Technology transfer, intellectual property rights, and
economic development in a historical perspective
In the history of industrialization, technology transfer has always played a
key role. Technology transfer during the sixteenth and the seventeenth
century from the then more advanced economies of Continental Europe
(especially Venice and the Low Countries) was critical in Britain’s transition
from a backward raw material producer to a leading manufacturing nation
(Cipolla, 1993; Reinert, 1995).1 After the British Industrial Revolution, the
effectiveness of technology transfer from Britain (and to a lesser extent from
the Low Countries) became the key determinant of a country’s prosperity
(Landes (1969) is the deŽnitive work on the transfer to the Continental
European countries; see Jeremy (1981) on the transfer to the United States).
Some of these transfers were obviously arranged through ‘legitimate’
means. Especially in the early days of industrialization when the technologies
employed were relatively simple to understand, a guided tour of a factory
by an expert could be enough to capture the essence of technology. Even
early on, however, some advanced producers refused to grant such tours or
at least concealed what they considered crucial parts from the visitors.
Apprenticeship was another common means to absorb advanced foreign
technologies. However, until the mid-nineteenth century, when machinery
became the key embodiment of technological knowledge, the most important means of technological transfer was the transfer of skilled workers, in
whom most technological knowledge was then embodied. As a result,
countries tried to recruit skilled workers from the more advanced countries
and also bring back nationals who were employed in advanced country
establishments — sometimes through a concerted effort orchestrated and
endorsed by the government (more on this later).
Needless to say, these efforts were most effective when backed by the
IPR and Economic Development
policies intended to enhance what modern economics of technology calls
‘‘technological capabilities’’ (see Fransman and King, 1984). Many governments set up institutions of teaching (e.g. technical schools) and research
(e.g. various non-teaching academies). They also took measures to raise
‘awareness’ in advanced technology in a number of ways. They established
museums, organized international expositions (‘expos’), bestowed new
machinery to private Žrms, and set up ‘model factories’ using advanced
technologies. These governments also provided the Žrms with Žnancial
incentives to use more advanced technology, especially through rebates and
exemptions of duties on imports of industrial equipment (see Landes (1969,
pp. 150–151) for further details).2
Very often, it should be noted, acquisition of advanced technology was
organized through ‘illegitimate’ means.3 Firms naturally wanted to shroud
their technologies in secrecy and therefore limited the access of foreigners
to their factories.4 Moreover, the governments of the more advanced countries played the critical role in limiting the outow of key technologies
(although exactly how effective they were is debatable).
In the early days of industrialization, the governments of the more
advanced countries mainly concentrated on controlling the migration of the
skilled workers, in whom most technologies then were embodied. In 1719,
prompted mainly by the French attempt (organized by the legendary Scottishborn Žnancier John Law of Mississippi-Company fame) to recruit hundreds
of skilled workers and to a lesser extent by a similar Russian attempt, Britain
introduced a ban on the migration of skilled workers, and especially on the
attempt to recruit such workers for jobs abroad (‘suborning’). According to
this law, anyone suborning was punishable through Žne or even imprisonment. Emigrant workers who did not return home in 6 months after being
warned to do so by an accredited British ofŽcial (usually diplomats stationed
abroad) would in effect lose their right to lands and goods in Britain, and
have their citizenship taken away. SpeciŽcally mentioned in the law were
industries such as wool, steel, iron, brass or any other metal, and watchmaking, but in practice the law covered all industries (see Jeremy (1977)
and Harris (1998, Chapter 18) for further details). The ban on emigration of
skilled labour and suborning lasted until 1825 (Landes, 1969, p. 148).
Subsequently, as increasing amounts of technologies got embodied in
machines, machine exports came under control. Britain introduced a new
Act in 1750 banning the export of ‘‘tools and utensils’’ in wool and silk
industries, while strengthening the punishments for suborning. The ban was
widened and strengthened in subsequent legislation. In 1774, another Act
was introduced to control machine exports in cotton and linen industries.
In 1781, the 1774 Act was revised and the wording ‘‘tools and utensils’’
changed to ‘‘any machine, engine, tool, press, paper, utensil or implement
whatsoever’’, indicating the increasing mechanization of the industries. In
1785, the Tools Act was introduced to ban exports of many different types
of machinery, which also included a ban on suborning. (Harris, 1998,
pp. 457–462; also see Jeremy, 1977). This ban lasted until 1842 (Landes,
1969, p. 148).5
H.-J. Chang
In response to these measures to prevent technology outows by the
advanced countries, the less advanced countries deployed all sorts of ‘illegitimate’ means to gain access to advanced technologies. The entrepreneurs and
the technicians of these countries, often with explicit state consent or even
active encouragement (including offers of bounty for securing speciŽc technologies), were routinely engaged in industrial espionage.6 Landes (1969),
Harris (1991 and 1992), and Bruland (1991), among others, document an
extensive range of industrial espionage vis-à-vis Britain by countries such as
France, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Despite all these ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ efforts, technological
catching-up was not an easy task. As the recent literature on technology
transfer shows, technology contains a lot of tacit knowledge, which cannot
be easily transferred. This problem was not easily solved even by the
importation of skilled workers even in the days when they embodied most
of the key technologies. These people had language and cultural problems,
and more importantly did not have access to the same technological infrastructure that they had at home. Landes (1969) documents how it took
decades for the Continental European countries to assimilate British technologies, even in the days when technologies were relatively simple so that
importing some skilled workers and perhaps a key machine could in theory
enable a technological follower to replicate what the leader was doing.
By the late nineteenth century, the observation (or not) of patents and
other intellectual property rights became a key issue in technology transfer
(and knowledge transfer in general). The bans on skilled worker migration
and machinery exports by Britain were abolished by the mid-nineteenth
century thanks to their increasing ineffectiveness. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the key technologies became so complex that importing
skilled workers and machinery was not enough to achieve command over a
technology. In many areas, an active transfer by the owner of technological
knowledge through licensing of patents emerged as a key channel of
technology transfer.
Most now-developed countries established their patent laws between
1790 and 1850, and established other elements of their IPR regimes, such as
copyright laws (Žrst introduced in Britain in 1709) and trademark laws (Žrst
introduced in Britain in 1862), in the second half of the nineteenth century.7
All of these IPR regimes were highly ‘deŽcient’ by the standards of our time.
Patent systems in many countries lacked disclosure requirements, incurred
very high costs in Žling and processing patent applications, and afforded
inadequate protection to the patentees. Few of them allowed patents on
chemical and pharmaceutical substances (as opposed to the processes) — a
practice that continued well into the last decades of the twentieth century
in many countries.8
And, most relevant for this paper, these laws accorded only very
inadequate protection of the IPR of foreign citizens (for further details, see
Williams, 1896; Penrose, 1951; Schiff, 1971; McLeod, 1988; Crafts, 2000;
Sokoloff and Khan, 2000). For example, many of patent laws were very lax
on checking the originality of the invention. More importantly, in most
IPR and Economic Development
countries, including Britain (before the 1852 Reform), the Netherlands,
Austria, and France, patenting of imported inventions by their nationals was
often explicitly allowed. In the US, before the 1836 overhaul of the patent
law, patents were granted without any proof of originality. This not only led
to the patenting of imported technologies, but encouraged racketeers to
engage in ‘rent-seeking’ by patenting devices already in use (‘phony patents’)
and by demanding money from their users under threat of suit for infringement (Cochran & Miller, 1942, p. 14).9 The cases of Switzerland and the
Netherlands in relation to their patent laws deserve even greater attention
(see Schiff (1971) for further details).
The Netherlands, which originally introduced a patent law in 1817,
abolished it in 1869, partly due to the rather deŽcient nature of the law
(even by the standards of the time)10 but also having been inuenced by the
widespread anti-patent movements in Europe at the time. This movement
condemned patents as being no different from other monopolistic practices
(Schiff, 1971; Machlup and Penrose (1951) documents the anti-patent movements of the time in detail).
Switzerland did not provide any protection of intellectual property until
1888, when a patent law protecting only mechanical inventions (‘‘inventions
that can be represented by mechanical models’’; Schiff, 1971, p. 85) was
introduced. Only in 1907, partly prompted by the threat of trade sanctions
from Germany in retaliation to the Swiss use of its chemical and pharmaceutical inventions, a patent law worth its name came into being. However,
even this had many exclusions, especially the refusal to grant patents to
chemical substances (as opposed to chemical processes). It was only in 1954
that the Swiss patent law became comparable with those of other advanced
countries (Schiff, 1971), although chemical substances remained unpatentable until 1978 (Patel, 1989, p. 980).
With the introduction of IPR laws in an increasing number of countries,
the pressures for an international IPR regime naturally started growing from
the late nineteenth century (the following details are from Penrose, 1951,
Chapter 3). The Žrst attempt to create an international IPR regime was the
1873 Vienna Congress. Especially controversial at this Congress was the
‘‘compulsory working’’ requirement that Austria and some other countries
had (in the Austrian case, a patented article had to be manufactured in
Austria within 1 year from the issue of the patent, or the patent was revoked).
The Congress concluded with a resolution that recommended ‘‘compulsory
licensing’’ instead of ‘‘compulsory working’’, despite objections from some
countries, notably the US.
Another conference was held in Paris in 1878, another ‘unofŽcial’ affair
like the Vienna Congress, with no ofŽcial government delegates. Unlike the
Vienna one, however, this was a very pro-patentee gathering. However, its
resolutions still showed some recognition of ‘public interest’ arguments and
accepted the principle of compulsory working (but, reecting its propatentee bias, rejected ‘‘compulsory licensing’’, on the ground that no one
other than the patentee should be able to beneŽt from an invention, should
the patentee prove unable to work it).
H.-J. Chang
The 1878 Paris Congress set up a commission that eventually produced
a draft convention that was discussed in the Žrst ‘ofŽcial’ meeting on the
international IPR regime (with representatives from 19 governments) in Paris
in 1880. This draft convention eventually got ratiŽed by 11 countries in Paris
in 1883 in the form of the Paris Convention of the International Union for
the Protection of Industrial Property (the original signatories were Belgium,
Portugal, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, San Salvador, Serbia,
Spain, Switzerland). It covered not just patents, but also trademark laws
(which enabled patentless Switzerland and Netherlands to sign up to the
Convention despite not having a patent law). In 1886, the Berne Convention
on copyrights was signed. The Paris Convention was subsequently revised a
number of times (notably 1911, 1925, 1934, 1958, and 1967) in the direction
of strengthening patentee rights and, together with the Berne convention,
had formed the basis of the international IPR regime until the TRIPS
agreement (Shell, 1998; see fourth section).
The Paris Convention had a number of characteristics (Penrose, 1951,
Chapter 4). First of all, despite strong US objection, it adopted a Žrm ‘nonreciprocity’ approach, where foreign citizens receive national treatment but
countries are not required to accord foreign citizens the same IPR that they
enjoy in their home countries. Second, it accepted the ‘‘right of priority’’,
which means that the Žling of an application for a patent in one country
gives the applicant the right to obtain recognition of his/her claim in all
other countries in which his/her invention is patentable. Most importantly,
it adopted both compulsory working and compulsory licensing. The compulsory working agreement was subsequently revised in 1925 to be acceptable
only when compulsory licensing proved ineffective.
However, de …
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