(Only do slides 10-12 include notes and examples in notes) I attached the chapterThe instructor asked that we outline the assigned chapter. Her instructions are as follows:- All slides must contain speaker notes- She stated we could copy/paste from the book- Copy/paste from other sources- Be sure to cite our references- She does not want the slides to be “Wordy”- She wants us to use bullet points with a few words- We can insert videos (2 min videos) in place of our bullet points as long as it’s relevant to the chapter content- We can use our experiences as they pertain to the contents in the chapter- Pictures are ok, but keep to a minimum- Pictures must be relevant to the contents of the chapter
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The development of computers, e-mail, and the Internet has made it easier for criminals to
perpetrate many existing crimes and has created the ability for them to commit crimes that did
not exist before the digital age. These are commonly referred to as cybercrimes . The
government has had to apply existing laws to these new media and develop new laws to attack
A crime that is committed using computers, e-mail, the Internet, or other electronic
One of the most pervasive monetary crimes today is Internet fraud. The following feature
discusses the crime of cyber identity theft.
Digital Law The Internet and Identity Theft
The advent of the computer, the Internet, and digital devices has made one type of crime—
identity theft—easier to commit. Identity theft was around long before the computer was
invented, but computers and the Internet have made it much easier for criminals to obtain the
information they need to commit identity theft. In identity theft—or ID theft—one person steals
information about another person to pose as that person and take the innocent person’s money or
property or to purchase goods and services using the victim’s credit information.
To commit ID theft, thieves must first obtain certain information about the victim. This could be
the victim’s name, Social Security number, credit card numbers, bank account information, and
other personal information. With the use of computers, criminals can obtain the information they
need to commit ID theft more easily. Credit card fraud is one of the crimes most commonly
committed by ID thieves. An ID thief may use a victim’s existing credit card or open new credit
card accounts in the victim’s name and purchase goods and services with these credit cards, often
using the Internet.
To address the growing problem of ID theft, Congress enacted the Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act .8 This statute makes it a federal crime to transfer or use, without
authority, the identity of another person knowingly and with the intent to commit any unlawful
activity as defined by federal law and state and local felony laws. Violators can be sentenced to
prison for up to 15 years and have any property used in the commission of ID theft forfeited to
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
A federal act that makes it a crime to transfer or use, without authority, the identity of
another person knowingly and with the intent to commit any unlawful activity as defined
by federal law and state and local felony laws.
Information Infrastructure Protection Act
The Internet and the information age ushered in a whole new world for education, business, and
consumer transactions. It also made cybercrimes possible. Prosecutors and courts have wrestled
with questions about how to apply existing laws written before the digital age to new Internetrelated abuses.
Congress responded by enacting the Information Infrastructure Protection (IIP) Act .9 The
act addresses computer-related crimes as distinct offenses. The IIP Act provides protection for
any computer attached to the Internet.
Information Infrastructure Protection (IIP) Act
A federal act that makes it a crime for anyone to access and acquire information
intentionally from a protected computer without authorization.
The IIP Act makes it a federal crime for anyone to access and acquire information intentionally
from a protected computer without authorization. The IIP Act does not require that the defendant
accessed a protected computer for commercial benefit. Thus, persons who transmit a computer
virus over the Internet or hackers who trespass into Internet-connected computers may be
criminally prosecuted under the IIP Act. Even merely observing data on a protected computer
without authorization is sufficient to meet the requirement that the defendant has accessed a
protected computer. Criminal penalties for violating the IIP Act include imprisonment and fines.
The IIP Act gives the federal government a much-needed weapon for directly prosecuting
cybercrooks, hackers, and others who enter, steal, destroy, or look at others’ computer data
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), as amended,
makes it a federal crime to access a computer knowingly to obtain (1) restricted federal
government information, (2) financial records of financial institutions, or (3) consumer reports of
consumer reporting agencies. The act also makes it a crime to use counterfeit or unauthorized
access devices, such as cards or code numbers, to obtain things of value, transfer funds, or traffic
in such devices.10
The following case involves computer crimes.
CASE 7.1 FEDERAL COURT CASE Computer Crime United States v. Barrington
648 F.3d 1178, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 16535 (2011) United States Court of Appeals for the
“We have no hesitation in concluding that the Government’s theory rested on a legally
cognizable theory of conspiracy to defraud by wire and computer.”
Marcus Barrington, Christopher Jacquette, and Lawrence Secrease were undergraduate students
at Florida A&M University (FAMU). They concocted a scheme to access FAMU’s Internetbased grading system. They went to the registrar’s office and surreptitiously installed keylogger
software on FAMU’s computers. The keylogger software recorded the keystrokes made by
registrar employees as they signed into their computers, capturing their usernames and
passwords. That data was automatically transmitted to various e-mail accounts, including
Barrington’s personal e-mail address.
With the usernames and passwords, Barrington and the others, using their own computers and
FAMU’s computers, accessed FAMU’s grading system and changed course grades for
themselves and other students. Barrington received approximately 30–35 grade changes,
Jacquette approximately 43, and Secrease approximately 36. Ultimately, the group made in
excess of 650 unauthorized grade changes for at least 90 students, including fraternity brothers.
Eventually, a professor uncovered the scheme, and the FAMU police and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation were notified.
Barrington, Jacquette, and Secrease were indicted and charged with the federal crimes of
conspiring to commit wire fraud using a protected computer, fraud using a protected computer,
and identity theft. Jacquette and Secrease entered into a plea agreement and were each sentenced
to 22 months in prison. Barrington went to trial and denied involvement in the scheme. Jacquette
was a witness against Barrington at Barrington’s trial. Barrington was convicted on all counts
and was sentenced to 7 years in prison. Barrington appealed his conviction and sentence.
Was Barrington guilty of the crimes charged and was the prison sentence appropriate?
Language of the Court
There was an adequate basis for the jury to find that Barrington actually committed the extrinsic
acts. Jacquette’s uncorroborated testimony was sufficient, since he had personal knowledge of
Barrington’s conduct. We have no hesitation in concluding that the Government’s theory rested
on a legally cognizable theory of conspiracy to defraud by wire and computer. The evidence was
sufficient to support Barrington’s convictions for aggravated identity theft. Barrington’s lack of
remorse, coupled with his false trial testimony, obstructive conduct during the investigation, and
what the district court described as his “arrogance and contempt for the law,” certainly justified
the sentence imposed.
The U.S. court of appeals affirmed Barrington’s conviction and prison sentence.
1. Should Barrington have entered into a plea deal before trial? Did Jacquette act ethically
by being a witness against Barrington? Was the 7-year prison sentence warranted?
Fourth Amendment Protection From Unreasonable
Search and Seizure
In many criminal cases, the government relies on information obtained from searches of
individuals and businesses. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects persons
and corporations from overzealous investigative activities by the government. It protects the
rights of the people from unreasonable search and seizure by the government. It permits
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.
unreasonable search and seizure
Protection granted by the Fourth Amendment for people to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure by the government.
Reasonable search and seizure by the government is lawful. Search warrants based on
probable cause are necessary in most cases. Such a warrant specifically states the place and
scope of the authorized search. General searches beyond the specified area are forbidden.
Warrantless searches are permitted only (1) incident to arrest, (2) where evidence is in “plain
view,” or (3) in exigent circumstances such as when it is likely that evidence will be destroyed.
Warrantless searches are judged by the probable cause standard.
A warrant issued by a court that authorizes the police to search a designated place for
specified contraband, articles, items, or documents. A search warrant must be based on
The police obtained a search warrant to attach a Global Positioning System (GPS) to a suspect’s
automobile, and the warrant stated that the device be installed within 10 days; however, the
police did not install the device until the 11th day. The U.S. Supreme Court held that this was an
unconstitutional search and that the evidence obtained from the search be excluded from
The following case involves the issue of search and seizure of evidence.
CASE 7.2 U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE Search Navarette v. California
134 S.Ct. 1683, 2014 U.S. Lexis 2930 (2014) Supreme Court of the United States
“A mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion.”
A driver of a vehicle called 911 and reported that a truck had run her off the road. She gave a
description of the vehicle and its license number to the 911 dispatcher. The dispatcher relayed
the information to California Highway Patrol officers, who located and stopped the truck. As two
officers approached the truck they smelled marijuana. A search of the truck bed revealed 30
pounds of marijuana. The officer arrested the driver, Lorenzo Prado Navarette, and the
passenger, José Prado Navarette (petitioners). The petitioners moved to suppress the evidence,
arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The California trial court denied their motion and the
petitioners were sentenced to 90 days in jail plus three years of probation. The California court of
appeals affirmed. The petitioners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Did the stop and search of the truck violate the Fourth Amendment?
Language of the U.S. Supreme Court
A mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion. But under appropriate circumstances an
anonymous tip can demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop. The caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged
dangerous driving. Another indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system.
The stop was therefore proper.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the stop and search of the truck based on the caller’s tip
comported with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and was therefore lawful.
1. Is there a possibility that someone might make a false report of criminal activity? How
much specificity is required for the tip to justify a lawful search?
Evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure is considered tainted evidence (“fruit
of a tainted tree”). Under the exclusionary rule , such evidence can generally be prohibited from
introduction at a trial or an administrative proceeding against the person searched. However, this
evidence is freely admissible against other persons.
A rule that says evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure can generally
be prohibited from introduction at a trial or an administrative proceeding against the
The U.S. Supreme Court created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.12 This
exception allows evidence obtained illegally to be introduced as evidence against the accused if
the police officers who conducted the unreasonable search reasonably believed that they were
acting pursuant to a lawful search warrant.
Critical Legal Thinking
1. Does the exclusionary rule allow some guilty parties to go free? Is this an acceptable
result when balanced against the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment?
In the following case, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether a search was reasonable.
CASE 7.3 U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE Search Maryland v. King
133 S.Ct. 1958, 2013 U.S. Lexis 4165 (2013) Supreme Court of the United States
“The advent of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific advancements of
In 2003, a man concealing his face and armed with a gun broke into a woman’s home in
Salisbury, Maryland, and then raped her. The police were unable to identify or apprehend the
assailant but they did obtain from the victim a sample of the perpetrator’s DNA
In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested in Maryland and charged with first- and second-degree
assault for menacing a group of people with a shotgun. As part of the booking procedure for
serious offenses, a DNA sample was taken from King by applying a cotton swab—known as a
buccal swab—to the inside of his cheeks. His DNA was found to match the DNA taken from the
Salisbury rape victim. King was tried and convicted of the 2003 rape. King alleged that the DNA
taken when he was booked in 2009 violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search
and seizure and therefore could not be used to convict him of the 2003 rape. The court of appeals
of Maryland agreed and set the rape conviction aside. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review.
Did Maryland’s collection of King’s DNA during the booking procedure in 2009 constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure?
Language of the U.S. Supreme Court
The advent of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific advancements of our era.
It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to
obtain DNA samples is a search. The Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a
reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers
make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the
suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking of the DNA from King at the time of booking was a
reasonable search and seizure and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals of Maryland.
1. Why did King want his DNA kept out of his criminal trial for the 2003 rape charge?
Should law enforcement and the courts rely on DNA evidence as much as they do?
The following case involves the issue of searching cell phones.
CASE 7.4 U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE Search of Cell Phones Riley v. California and
United States v. Wurie
134 S.Ct. 2473, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4497 (2014) Supreme Court of the United States
“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple — get a warrant.”
—Roberts, Chief Justice
Two cases were combined for decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the first case, David Riley
was stopped for driving with expired registration tags. A search of the car turned up two
concealed and loaded firearms. The police confiscated Riley’s smart phone and went through it
and found gang related information and a photograph of Riley in front of a car they suspected to
be involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier. Based on the information retrieved from the cell
phone Riley was charged in connection with that earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied
vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic weapon, and attempted murder. Riley was convicted of all
charges and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
In the second case, police observed Brima Wurie making an apparent drug sale from a car. The
officers arrested Wurie and seized two cell phones from him. After monitoring the calls made to
the cell phones, police determined the location of the calls, which was Wurie’s apartment. The
police went to the apartment and searched the apartment and found and seized crack cocaine,
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash. Wurie was charged with
distributing crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Wurie was convicted and
sentenced to 262 months in prison.
Prior to their trials, Riley and Wurie moved to suppress all the evidence the police obtained from
their cell phones, alleging that the information obtained from their cell phones were the fruits of
an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The courts in each case denied
their requests. After appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear these combined
Can the police, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone from an individual
who has been arrested?
Language of the U.S. Supreme Court
These cases require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell
phones. Courts have approved searches of a variety of personal items carried by an arrestee (e.g.,
billfolds, address books, wallets, and purses). The government parties assert that a search of all
data stored on a cell phone is materially indistinguishable from searches of these sorts of
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other objects that might be
kept on an arrestee’s person. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical
realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy. But the
possible intrusion on privacy is not limited in the same way when it comes to cell phones.
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.
Chief Judge Cardozo
People v. Defore 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 1926 N.Y. Lexis 956 (1926)
Today, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own
a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the
mundane to the intimate. Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is
quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all
they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” Our answer to the
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that police cannot, without a warrant, search digital information on
a cell phone from an individual who has been arrested.
Does the Supreme Court’s decision protect privacy rights? Did the Supreme Court justices
evidence an understanding of the digital world in their opinion?
Searches of Business Premises
Generally, the government does not have the right to se …
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